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Abstract
In the rst chapter of the thesis, I assess possible risks and challenges of implementing
ination targeting strategy in more complicated, but at the same time more realistic,
DSGE model economies. I focus on analysis of optimal monetary policy and welfare
in a model of a small open economy with multiple domestic sectors, which have di¤er-
ent structural characteristics. The ndings suggest that openness to trade as well as
sector-specic features do matter for monetary policy design thus generating important
implications for optimal stabilization objectives. The ranking of simple rules indicates
that exible CPI targeting regime is able to closely replicate the optimal solution and
outperform the policy of domestic ination stabilization. The presence of sectoral
asymmetries may alter the relative performance of alternative policy rules. The second
part of the thesis (with S. Slobodyan) is devoted to robustness issues of Bayesian
estimation of DSGE models. We investigate the consequences of relaxing the rational
expectations hypothesis and contrast model t, estimated parameters, and perceived
ination persistence for several DSGE models of the Euro area estimated under adap-
tive learning and rational expectations. We nd that assuming adaptive expectations
results in better model t than if rational expectations are used, especially when the
agents use very little information to form their beliefs. Estimated parameters and the
model t depend signicantly on the information set used by the agents, which might
explain widely divergent results of previous estimations under adaptive learning.
V první µcásti práce pµriµrazuji moµzná rizika a výzvy strategii implementování cílení in-
ace v komplikovanµejích, ale o to více realistiµctµejích, DSGEmodelových ekonomikách.
Zamµeµruji se na analýzu optimální monetární politiky a blahobytu v DSGE modelu
malé otevµrené ekonomiky s nµekolika domácími sektory, které mají rozdílné strukturální
charakteristiky. Výsledky ukazují, µze otevµrenost k obchodu stejnµe jako na sektoru
závislé prvky jsou významné pro monetární politiku a tudíµz jsou významné pro tvoµrené
optimálních stabilizaµcních cíl°u. Oceµnování jednoduchých pravidel naznaµcuje, µze exi-
bilní cílení CPI je schopné pµresnµe replikovat optimální µreení a pµredµcít politiku domácí
inaµcní stabilizace. Pµrítomnost sektorové asymetrie m°uµze zmµenit relativní výkonnost
r°uzných monetárních pravidel. Druhá µcást práce (s S. Slobodyanem) se vµenuje otázkám
robustnosti pµri Bayesovském odhadování v DSGE modelech. Zkoumáme dopady op-
utµení hypotézy racionálního rozhodování a dáváme do souvislosti t modelu, odhad-
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nuté parametry a inaµcní setrvaµcnost pro nµekolik DSGE model°u Euro oblasti pro adap-
tivní uµcení a racionální oµcekávání. Zji,tujeme, µze pµredpoklad adaptivních oµcekávání
vede k lepímu odhadu modelu neµz pµri racionálních oµcekávání, obzvlátµe kdyµz agenti
pouµzívají velmi málo informací pro tvorbu svých odhad°u. Odhadnuté parametry a t
modelu výraznµe závisí na pouµzitém informaµcním setu pouµzívaném agenty, coµz m°uµze
vysvµetlit velmi rozdílné výsledky odhad°u pro adaptivní uµcení.
iv
Introduction
The rst part of the thesis is motivated by current practice of policy conduct that has
been recently implemented by many monetary institutions. In particular, a new opera-
tional framework, ination targeting, has been introduced by the most advanced central
banks. At the same time, DSGE models became widely used for systematic evaluation
of macroeconomic e¤ects of a certain policy as well as for forecasting. The second mo-
tivating factor was the observation that modern economies represent complex systems
composed of elements that may have very di¤erent characteristics. Empirical evidence,
which exists for many European countries, indicates that the pace of productivity im-
provements, price and wage setting schemes, and as result ination persistence, may
vary signicantly across sectors. For such economies it is not straightforward to iden-
tify whether targeting of the aggregate (domestic or consumer price) ination would
be the best approach from the welfare view point. In the rst chapter of the the-
sis, I assess possible risks and challenges of implementing ination targeting policy in
more complicated, but at the same time more realistic, DSGE model economies. The
question I address is whether it is optimal to account for sector-specic characteris-
tics when implementing monetary plan or can welfare be maximized following simple,
uniform strategies. More specically, I analyze the stabilization objectives of optimal
monetary policy and the trade-o¤s facing the central bank in a two-sector, small open
economy model obtained as a limiting case of a two-country Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium framework. It is assumed that sectors have di¤erent characteristics
(sector-specic shocks, preference parameters, degree of nominal rigidities). The nd-
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ings suggest that openness to trade as well as sector-specic features do matter for
monetary policy design thus generating important implications for optimal stabiliza-
tion objectives and social welfare. The ranking of simple rules indicates that exible
CPI targeting regime is able to closely replicate the optimal solution and outperform
the policy of domestic ination stabilization. Finally, the sensitivity analysis demon-
strates that the presence of sectoral asymmetries may alter the relative performance of
alternative policy rules.
The second part of the thesis (with S. Slobodyan) is devoted to robustness issues of
Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. This work was motivated by recent tendency to
use estimated DSGE models for policy analysis and by large literature that highlights
challenges in the modeling approach, and more specically, in the ability of DSGE
models to match empirically the observed features of the data. Standard RBC models
with rational expectations tend to miss the observed persistence of the key macroeco-
nomic time series such as ination, output, investment, etc. The proposed extensions
to a standard framework suggest complementing a micro-founded stylized models with
a number of nominal and real rigidities such as habit formation, Calvo pricing, index-
ation, adjustment costs, which enable capturing the dynamic properties of real data.
However, recent DSGE-VAR analysis provides evidence that even friction-augmented
DSGE models remain misspecied. Various assumptions about the potential source of
persistence can result in a di¤erent dynamics of the key macro variables. For example,
the inclusion of "mechanical" endogenous persistence mechanism, such as habit forma-
tion and price indexation, can inuence the consumption and ination dynamics and
considerably change the overall performance of the model. For that reason, the empir-
ical literature attempts to assess the validity of alternative modeling assumptions and
evaluate the ability of various DSGE models to t macroeconomic data. In this paper,
we attempt to improve DSGE model t as well as to address the issue of possible model
misspecications by departing from the rational expectation (RE) hypothesis and in-
corporating more empirically realistic mechanism of publics expectation formation.
More specically, we investigate the consequences of relaxing the rational expectations
hypothesis and contrast model t, estimated parameters, and perceived ination persis-
tence for several DSGE models of the Euro area estimated under rational expectations
and adaptive learning. We add to answering the following underlying questions: How
restrictive is the RE hypothesis for estimated DSGE models? Can adaptive learning
generate endogenous persistence at the same time reducing structural rigidities? In
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other words, we evaluate empirically the relative importance of several types of "fric-
tions" - "mechanical" rigidities like habit formation, Calvo pricing, adjustment costs
etc. versus learning. Our major contribution is that we provide the answer to these
questions by o¤ering a comprehensive analysis of the factors which could determine a
diversity of the estimation results under adaptive learning. In such a way we wish to
reconcile contradicting conclusions from the previous studies. We study the robustness
of the estimation results in several dimensions: by varying the model size, information
set available to the learning agents, and the way of forming agentsinitial beliefs. We
nd that assuming adaptive expectations results in better model t than if rational
expectations are used, especially when the agents use very little information to form
their beliefs. Estimated parameters and the model t depend signicantly on the infor-
mation set used by the agents, which might explain widely divergent results of previous
estimations under adaptive learning. We also nd that di¤erent ways of forming the
initial beliefs inuence the dynamics of the model under learning.
3
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Chapter 1
The Implications of
Sectoral Heterogeneity for Monetary Policy
and Welfare in a Small Open Economy: A
Linear Quadratic Framework
Abstract:
Modern economies exhibit various structural and dynamic characteristics. At the same time,
many central banks have implemented the similar strategy, i.e. ination targeting, as an
operational framework. Controversial normative issue - is such stabilization objective welfare
maximizing for more complex models with heterogeneous elements across sectors? This ar-
ticle analyzes optimal monetary strategy and policy trade-o¤s in a DSGE model of an open
economy with traded and non- traded sectors. We approximate the utility of the represen-
tative consumer to obtain a micro-founded quadratic loss function of the form extensively
used for monetary policy assessment. The central banks optimal strategy is computed and
optimal and simple policy rules compared according to the derived welfare measure. We
assess the role of openness, structural characteristics, and relative prices for monetary policy
design. The model is calibrated to match the moments of main macroeconomics variables
of Canadian economy. The ndings suggest that central banks objectives display sector-
specic features thus generating important implications for optimal policy and welfare. The
ranking of simple rules indicates that exible CPI targeting regime that includes a certain
degree of internal relative prices management is able to closely replicate the optimal solution
and outperform the policy of domestic ination stabilization. Finally, we conduct the sen-
sitivity analysis and evaluate welfare implications of sectoral heterogeneity for targeting the
alternative price indices.
JEL classication: E52, E58, E61, F41
Keywords: DSGE models, non-traded goods, optimal monetary policy
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1.1 Introduction
In recent decades the approach to monetary policy conduct has shifted to a more sys-
tematic one. Many central banks have formulated their policy objectives explicitly
and, more specically, have announced their commitment to price stabilization as the
overriding policy goal. As a result, a new operational framework, ination targeting,
has been introduced by the most advanced central banks. At the same time, impor-
tant features of modern economies, such as the social and economic consequences of
unemployment, uncertainties of various types, asymmetric economic structure, and in-
terrelations with the rest of the world, have brought about e¤orts to widen the range
of policy objectives beyond ination (price) stability alone. Therefore, over the past
several years, the attention of economists has turned to the issue of whether strict ina-
tion targeting indeed represents the best strategy from the welfare viewpoint. Another
important question is the sensitivity of the conclusions to di¤erent, more complicated
model frameworks.
The important attribute of real economies is that they represent the complex sys-
tems with various structural and dynamic characteristics. Should policymakers account
for structural heterogeneity across economic elements when implementing the mone-
tary strategy, or should they assume that welfare can be maximized under the uniform
specication of the policy objectives? This paper aims to contribute to the discussion
of this crucial issue of monetary policy design and practical implementation.
The analysis of optimal monetary strategies has been performed in a number of
studies. One thread in the literature computes optimal policy under assumed wel-
fare objectives. In particular, the loss function of the central bank usually takes the
quadratic form with terms such as ination (CPI or domestic) and the output gap,
with the weights in front of each target chosen ad hoc. This approach is very popular
in applied research because it greatly simplies the derivations and brings the model
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dynamics closer to the real data. At the same time, such an approach assumes cer-
tain policy objectives a priory. An alternative methodology analyzes optimal monetary
policy on the basis of the objective function of the central bank which is derived from
micro-foundations. This paper contributes to the second class of literature and adds
to the analysis of optimal policy in open economies, where the formulation of policy
targets appears to be more controversial compared to a closed economy setting. It has
been shown that welfare-maximizing monetary policy in a closed economy should aim
to completely stabilize CPI ination and the output gap (Woodford, 2003). In the lit-
erature on open economies, the critical questions are whether the central bank should
also target open economy variables, i.e. the exchange rate, and how the targeting of
domestic variables changes under the exposure of the economy to external factors. An-
other topic which has attracted a great deal of attention from both researchers and
practitioners is related to the determination of the appropriate ination measure that
has to be stabilized. This issue gains particular relevance for the studies of models
with heterogeneous economic structure, which implies the di¤erentiated response of
domestic elements to disturbances of the same type.
A surprising conclusion drawn by several authors who have performed explicit wel-
fare derivation for models of open economies is that exchange rate uctuations have
no direct impact on welfare. Specically, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) nd that
under perfect exchange rate pass-through, the qualitative results for the closed econ-
omy carry over to the open economy. Gali and Monacelli (2005), who characterize the
welfare of a small open economy for a special case of parameter values and under the
balanced trade assumption, support the previous result and conclude that the small
open economy problem is identical to that of a closed economy. The above results
taken at face value imply optimality of complete exchange rate exibility.
However, a number of recent studies have challenged this nding. Specically,
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Sutherland (2002), and Monacelli (2003) show that under
incomplete pass-through, optimal policy is not purely inward looking. Benigno and Be-
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nigno (2006) analyze the gains from international monetary policy cooperation. They
study the conditions under which individual countries have incentives to inuence the
terms of trade and thus to deviate from the socially optimal point. De Paoli (2006)
nds that the simple violation of purchasing power parity (PPP), which arises from
home bias in consumption, brings in a role for targeting the real exchange rate in a
one-sector small open economy model. Liu and Pappa (2005) consider a two-sector,
open economy model in a two-country framework. Their study provides interesting
insights into the impact of an asymmetric structure between sectors on the gains from
cooperation. Their results suggest that in an economy with multiple sectors, and thus
multiple sources of nominal rigidities, optimal monetary policy cannot replicate a ex-
ible price allocation creating the scope for coordination. The important limitation of
their work for the analysis of optimal monetary policy is the assumption of unitary
elasticity of substitution across goods and a logarithmic utility function. As a result,
under this very special case, important welfare e¤ects vanish and general conclusions
concerning the optimal monetary policy cannot be derived.
In this work, we analyze the stabilization objectives of optimal monetary policy
and the trade-o¤s facing the central bank in a two-sector, small open economy model
obtained as a limiting case of a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
framework. We assess the role of structural asymmetries, general preferences, and mul-
tiple relative prices for monetary policy design and welfare evaluation. We contribute to
the normative analysis of open economies by introducing a more complicated economic
structure, namely, multiple domestic sectors combined with a variety of sector-specic
and foreign shocks. In addition, we consider a general specication of preferences (the
elasticity of substitution is non-unitary). These features of the model di¤erentiate our
work from the previous studies, which derived their results for the special cases of
unitary elasticity of substitution across goods or, alternatively, relied on the ad hoc
objective functions. By abstracting from those simplifying assumptions we are able to
uncover additional welfare e¤ects specic to the open multisectoral economy and make
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a methodological contribution by deriving the utility-based welfare measure and the
optimal reaction function of the central bank under more generalized preferences. For
this purpose we employ the linear-quadratic solution methods discussed in Benigno
and Benigno (2006) and Benigno and Woodford (2005), which involve computation of
a second-order approximation of the utility function and model structural equations.
This approach enables us to analyze the determinants of optimal monetary policy and
rank alternative monetary policy regimes on the basis of a rigorous welfare measure
derived from micro foundations and approximated by a tractable quadratic form. In
addition, we study how the optimal price index that has to be stabilized is a¤ected by
structural asymmetries. In particular, we evaluate the welfare benets from targeting
sector-specic versus aggregate price indices (domestic or CPI ination) for various
degrees of relative price stickiness. We calibrate the model to match the moments of
variables of Canadian economy.
The results of our study suggest that the loss function of the central bank, which
describes the welfare maximizing stabilization objectives, displays the features of both
an open economy and multisectoral economic structure. Specically, it is shown that
social welfare is a¤ected by variations in domestic ination rates and output gaps (with
sector-specic weights) as well as in the relative prices (including the exchange rate).
We derive the optimal targeting rule, which determines the variables (targets) to which
the central bank should respond in order to achieve e¢ cient allocation of resources as
well as the magnitude of such a response. Furthermore, we experiment with alter-
native simple rules and analyze their ability to replicate the optimal solution. We
present a ranking of alternative simple rules, which indicates the costs of implement-
ing alternative monetary strategies and can provide useful information for managing
the conicting policy objectives. Our results suggest that, in general, targeting the
aggregate (domestic or CPI) ination is not the best approximation for the optimal
policy, and social welfare can be improved by accounting for sector-specic inlfaiton
rates as well as other policy objectives, namely, the output gap and the relative prices.
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We show that simple rules with aggregate variables (inations) which incorporate a
response to relative price changes achieve better stabilization of sector-specic volatili-
ties, improve welfare, and thus closely approximate the optimal solution. Such a result
is important because a strategy which di¤erentiates the response between domestic
sectors is di¢ cult to design and implement in practice. Generally, the simple rules
perform quite well in terms of macroeconomic stabilization (relative to the optimal
rule) and can deliver reasonable welfare results. We perform a sensitivity analysis in
order to study the impact of sectoral heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness,
the elasticity of substitution, and the degree of openness on the relative performance of
policy rules with sector-specic and aggregate variables (ination rates). We nd that
the implications of asymmetric nominal rigidities di¤er for closed and open economies.
Welfare benets from targeting the "core" versus broader ination index increase as
the economy becomes more open and prices in the non-traded sector relatively stickier.
In addition, it is welfare improving to weigh appropriately the sectoral ination rates
if the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods rises. On the contrary,
as goods in the non-traded sector become relatively more elastic, the benets from
targeting the measure of the core ination gradually vanish and policy of the domestic
ination stabilization approximates the optimal strategy rather well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3
describes the equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 analyzes the monetary policy problem
and welfare. Section 5 describes the results of the numerical simulation. Section 6
illustrates the welfare implications of alternative simple rules. The sensitivity analysis
is presented in section 7. Finally, the results of the paper are summarized in section 8.
1.2 A Two-Sector, Small Open Economy Model
The framework is represented by a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model
where both sides, Home (the open economy H) and Foreign (the rest of the world,
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the relatively closed economy F ), are explicitly modeled. The small open economy
problem is derived as a limiting case of such a framework (as in De Paoli, 2006). Each
country has two domestic sectors, which produce traded and non-traded goods; the
share of non-traded goods may vary in the consumption basket of each country. A
continuum of innitively lived households consumes the nal consumption good, which
includes goods produced in both domestic sectors as well as imported goods. House-
holds produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods and receive disutility from production.
We introduce monopolistic distortion and sticky prices in both sectors. These assump-
tions represent the standard way of introducing the role for monetary policy into such
class of models. Households as consumers maximize their utility and solve the optimal
price-setting problem as producers.
The model specication allows us to consider the closed economy, the open one-
sector economy, and the economy with unitary elasticity of substitution as special cases
of our more general analysis. We assume sector-specic productivity, scal, and mark-
up shocks; the degree of nominal rigidities may also di¤er across sectors. Furthermore,
we assume production subsidies in order to o¤set the monopolistic distortions in both
sectors. The international and domestic asset markets are complete.
1.2.1 Representative Households
In our two-country framework a continuum of domestic households belong to the in-
terval [0; n), while foreign agents belong to the segment (n; 1]. The utility function of
a representative consumer in country H or F is given by:
U jt = Et
( 1X
s=t
s t[U(Cjs)  V (ys;T (j); Ais;T )  V (ys;N(j); Ais;N)]
)
;
where j is the index specic to the household, and i is the country index; Et denotes
the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t, and  is the
intertemporal discount factor. U(.) represents the ows of utility from consumption
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of a composite good and V (:) stands for the ows of disutility from production of
di¤erentiated goods. Each household produces two types of di¤erentiated goods 
traded and non-traded. The home economy produces a continuum of di¤erentiated
traded goods indexed on the interval [0; n], whereas the foreign economys traded goods
belong to the interval (n; 1]. In addition, a continuum of di¤erentiated non-traded
goods are indexed on the interval [0; n] and (n; 1] for the home and foreign country,
respectively. A denotes a productivity shock that can be country and sector specic.
The subscript T stands for the traded sector, whereasN denotes the non-traded sector.
In our analysis we assume that preferences have isoelastic functional form:
U(Cjs) =
(Cjs)
1 
1   ; V (ys;L(j); A
i
s;L) = (A
i
s;L)
  (ys;L(j))
1+
1 + 
;
where L = H;N ;  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, and   0 is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of goods production.
The composite consumption good C is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of traded and non-
traded goods dened as:
Cj = [
1
! (CjN )
! 1
! + (1  ) 1! (CjT )
! 1
! ]
!
! 1 ;
where CN and CT are the consumption sub-indices that refer to the consumption of
non-traded and traded goods, respectively, ! > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution, and  is a preference parameter that measures the relative weight that
individuals put on non-traded goods.
Preferences for the rest of the world are specied in a similar fashion:
Cj = [()
1
! (CjN )
! 1
! + (1  ) 1! (CjT )
! 1
! ]
!
! 1 ;
where the asterisk denotes a foreign country variable.
Traded consumption goods are the aggregators of goods produced at home and
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abroad and dened as:
CjT = [
1
C
 1

H + (1  )
1
C
 1

F ]

 1 ;
CjT = [(
)
1
 (CH)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (CF )
 1
 ]

 1 ;
where  and  are the parameters that determine the preferences of agents in countries
H and F , respectively, for the consumption of goods produced at Home.
As in Sutherland (2002) and De Paoli (2006) we assume that , the share of
imported goods from country H in the consumption basket of country F , increases
proportionally to the relative size of the home economy n and the degree of openness
e. Thus we assume that  = ne. Similarly, (1 ) = (1 n)e. Such a specication
allows modeling of home bias in consumption as a consequence of di¤erent country size
and degree of openness.
The consumption sub-indices of non-traded, home-produced, and foreign-produced
di¤erentiated goods are dened as follows:
CN =
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
cN(z)
 1
 dz
35  1 ; CN =
24 1
1  n
 1

1Z
n
cN(z)
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
CH =
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
ch(z)
 1
 dz
35  1 ; CF =
24 1
1  n
 1

1Z
n
cf (z)
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
CH =
24 1
n
 1

nZ
0
ch(z)
 1
 dz
35  1 ; CF =
24 1
1  n
 1

1Z
n
cf (z)
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated goods.
The corresponding consumption-based price indexes for countries H and F take
the form:
P = [P 1 !N + (1  )P 1 !T ]
1
1 ! (1)
PT = [P
1 
H + (1  )P 1 F ]
1
1  (1a)
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P  = [()(P N)
1 ! + (1  )(P T )1 !]
1
1 ! (2)
P T = [(
)(P H)
1  + (1  )(P F )1 ]
1
1  : (2a)
The price sub-indices for home, foreign, and non-traded goods in the two economies
are:
PN =
24 1
n
 nZ
0
pN(z)
1 d(z)
35 11  P N =
24 1
1  n
 1Z
n
pN(z)
1 d(z)
35
1
1 
;
PH =
24 1
n
 nZ
0
ph(z)
1 d(z)
35 11  PF =
24 1
1  n
 1Z
n
pf (z)
1 d(z)
35
1
1 
;
P H =
24 1
n
 nZ
0
ph(z)
1 d(z)
35 11  P F =
24 1
1  n
 1Z
n
pf (z)
1 d(z)
35
1
1 
;
where pN(z); pH(z); and pF (z) are prices in units of the domestic currency of the home-
produced non-traded and traded goods, and foreign-produced goods. The law of one
price holds for di¤erentiated goods, i.e., ph(z) = S  ph(z) and pf (z) = S  pf (z), where
S is the nominal exchange rate, dened as the price of the foreign currency in terms
of the domestic currency. This in turn implies that PH = S  P H and PF = S  P F .
However, equations (1) and (2) demonstrate that the presence of non-traded goods
and the home bias in consumption result in a violation of the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP), i.e., P 6= S P . Thus, the real exchange rate is not equal to one and is dened
as ER = SP

P
. The real exchange rate determinants will be more explicitly analyzed
in subsection 2.5.
1.2.2 Aggregate Demand
By solving the consumers cost minimization problem, we derive the total demand for
the di¤erentiated goods produced in countries H and F as well as the demand for the
non-traded goods in both countries. The resulting demand equations for country H
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take the following form:
ydh(z) =

ph(z)
PH
 
2666666664
 
PT
P
 ! PH
PT
 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1  )C +   1
ER
 !264


+(1 )(PFH)1 

+
1 
(PFH) 1+(1 )

375
 !
1 
(1  )C 1 n
n
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
+GH
3777777775
(3)
ydN(z) =

pN(z)
PN
  "
PN
P
 !
C +GN
#
; (4)
and for goods produced in country F:
ydf (z) =

pf (z)
PF
 
2666666664
 
PT
P
 ! PF
PT
 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1  )(1  )C n
1 n +
 
1
ER
 !264


+(1 )(PFH)1 

+
1 
(PFH) 1+(1 )

375
 !
1 
(1  )(1  )C
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
+GF
3777777775
(5)
ydN(z) =

pN(z)
P N
  "
P N
P 
 !
C +GN
#
; (6)
where G and G are country and sector-specic government purchase shocks, PFH =
PF
PH
is the relative price of foreign to home-produced goods, i.e., the terms of trade, and
ER is the real exchange rate.
In order to obtain the small open economy version of our general two-country
framework, we apply the assumptions  = n  e and (1   ) = (1   n)  e and
take the limit n ! 0 similar to De Paoli (2006). As a result, the demand equations
can be simplied to:
ydh(z) =

ph(z)
PH
  264
 
PT
P
 ! PH
PT
 

(1  )C +   1
ER
 ! h 1
(PFH) 1+(1 )
i  !
1 
(1  )eC+GH
375
(7)
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ydf (z) =

pf (z)
PF
  264
 
PT
P
 ! PF
PT
 
 
1
ER
 ! h 1
(PFH) 1+(1 )
i  !
1 
(1  )C

+GF
375 : (8)
Therefore, the demand side for our two-sector, small open economymodel is represented
by equations (4), (6), (7), and (8).
The demand equations illustrate the small open economy implications, the impact
of the economic structure, and a more general specication of preferences. In particular,
the demand for goods produced at Home depends on both domestic and foreign con-
sumption, whereas the demand for foreign-produced goods is not a¤ected by changes
in Home consumption. Moreover, the two-sector model specication brings in the dif-
ferentiated impact of the terms of trade and the real exchange rate on the total demand
for tradable goods. This happens under the general assumption that  6= !: The lit-
erature on open economies usually assumes that  > ! ,  > 1, and ! is small. This
implies that non-traded and traded goods are complements in the consumption basket.
At the same time, home and foreign-produced goods are considered as substitutes.
1.2.3 International Risk Sharing
Foreign and domestic households have access to the international nancial market,
where state-contingent nominal bonds are traded. Households at home and abroad
make their optimal consumption-saving decisions. They maximize their utility subject
to the sequence of budget constraints for t = 0; 1; :::
PtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1  Bt +t + Tt;
where Bt+1 is the holding of a nominal state-contingent bond that pays one unit of
home currency in period t + 1, Dt;t+1 is the period t price of the bond, t is the
prot income from goods production, and Tt is the transfer from the government. The
complete-market assumption implies that the marginal rate of substitution between
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consumption in the two countries is equalized:
UC(C

t+1)
UC(Ct )
P t
P t+1
St
St+1
=
UC(Ct+1)
UC(Ct)
Pt
Pt+1
: (9)
The international risk-sharing equation presented above illustrates the equality of nomi-
nal wealth in both countries in all states and time periods. The violation of PPP implies
that uctuations in the real exchange rate may result in a divergence in consumption
across countries even under optimal risk sharing.
Consumersoptimization problem implies the following Euler equation:
UC(Ct) = 

UC(Ct+1)Rt
Pt
Pt+1

;
where Rt is the nominal interest rate. Log-linearization of this condition leads to the
following expression:
brt =  bCt+1   bCt+ Et+1: (9a)
1.2.4 Optimal Pricing Decisions
Each household is a monopolistic producer of one di¤erentiated traded and one non-
traded good. The domestic household sets the price pN(z) and ph(z) and takes as
given P , PN , PH , PF , and C. The price-setting behavior is modeled according to Calvo
(1983). In countries H and F in each time period a fraction L 2 [0; 1) of randomly
picked producers in each sector (L = N;H) are not allowed to change their prices. Thus
the parameter L reects the level of price stickiness. The remaining fraction (1 L)
can choose the optimal sector-specic price by maximizing the expected discounted
value of prots:
Et
1X
S=t
(L)
S t

UC(CS)
PS
(1  S)ept;L(z)eyt;S;L(z)  V (eyt;S;L(z); AS;L) ;
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where after-tax revenues in each sector are evaluated using the marginal utility of
nominal income, UC(CS)
PS
; which is identical for all households in the country under
the assumption of complete markets; S is the tax rate; ept;L(z) is the price of the
di¤erentiated good z, which is produced in sector L, chosen at time t , and eyt;S;L(z) is
the total demand for good z, produced in sector L, at time S, conditional on the fact
that the price ept;L(z) has not been changed. All producers who belong to the fraction
(1  L) choose the same price.
The optimal price ept;L(z), which is derived from the rst-order conditions, takes the
following form:
ept;L(z) = Et
1P
S=t
(L)
S tV (eyt;S;L(z); AS;L)eyt;S;L(z)
Et
1P
S=t
(L)S t
UC(CS)
PS
1
S
eyt;S;L(z) ; (10)
where S;L =

(1 S;L)( 1) represents the overall degree of monopolistic distortion and
leads to an ine¢ cient gap between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
disutility of production. Benigno and Benigno (2006) and De Paoli (2006) refer to this
gap as the mark-up shock. A Calvo-type setting implies the following law of motion
for the sectoral price indices:
PL;t = [L(PL;t 1)1  + (1  L)ept;L(z)1 ] 11  : (11)
Similar conditions can be derived for the producers in country F .
1.2.5 Real Exchange Rate Decomposition and PPP Violation
In order to explore the structural economic factors that result in PPP violation, we
consider the real exchange rate decomposition. The real exchange rate is dened as
ER = SP

P
. We use the price indexes (1), (1a), (2), and (2a) to express the real
exchange rate as a function of relative prices and preference parameters. We also use
the fact that the law of one price holds for tradable goods, i.e., PH = S  P H and
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PF = S  P F . The real exchange rate can be presented as:
ER =

 + (1  )(PFH)1 
 + (1  )(PFH)1 
 1
1  (P NT )1 ! + (1  )
(PNT )1 ! + (1  )
 1
1 !
; (12)
where PFH is the terms of trade dened in the previous sections, and PNT = PNPT and
P NT =
P N
P T
are the relative prices of non-traded goods in the two countries. Such a
decomposition enables us to analyze the di¤erent channels of PPP violation. First of
all, we note that under  6= ;the ER is a¤ected by the terms of trade. For our small
open economy model specication, given the assumptions on  and ; the di¤erence
in country size necessarily results in di¤erent shares of consumption of home-produced
goods in countries H and F. This so-called home bias channel has also been analyzed
by De Paoli (2006) and Sutherland (2002).
Another important component that explains the deviation of the ER from PPP is
determined by the multisectoral economic structure. Specically, di¤erent preferences
for consumption of non-traded goods across countries, i.e.,  6= ; as well as changes
in the relative price of non-traded goods determine the uctuation in the ER. The
divergence in relative prices may occur as a result of country or sector-specic produc-
tivity shocks. Moreover, the law of one price holds for traded goods only. Nothing
can ensure that the same equality will hold for the goods produced in the non-traded
sector. Therefore, the exchange rate in our model is a composite term of two types of
relative prices. As far as the policy issues are concerned, such a distinction implies a
more di¢ cult task of exchange rate management.
1.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
1.3.1 Sticky Price Equilibrium
The equilibrium dynamics under sticky prices are characterized by the optimality con-
ditions derived in section 2. Here, we present a log-linearized version of the model.
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We dene bxt  ln xtx as the log deviation of the equilibrium variable xt under sticky
prices from its steady state value. bxtflex  ln xflextx represents the log deviation of the
equilibrium variable xt under exible prices from its steady state value. Under the as-
sumption of exible prices, producers can re-optimize every period so that their pricing
decisions are synchronized. As a result the price dispersion among the di¤erentiated
goods is zero. Therefore, the price index in each sector is equal to the price set by each
producer in this sector, and the main source of domestic distortion is eliminated. We
will refer to bxt   bxtflex as the deviation of the variable bxt from its natural level, i.e.,
the gap. At the same time, Benigno and Woodford (2005) and De Paoli (2006) demon-
strate that under certain conditions, the exible price equilibrium does not represent
the most e¢ cient allocation of resources, and the desired levels of variables which the
policymaker wishes to achieve in order to eliminate the loss may di¤er from the exible
price allocation. Specically, in the presence of mark-up and scal shocks as well as
the condition  6= 1, the exible price allocation diverges from the desired targets.
Therefore, in general, the optimal policy aims to stabilize of the variables relative to
their target level. Thus, we dene the welfare relevant gap as bxt   bxtT , where bxtT is
the target level of the variable bxt. Both the exible price equilibrium and the target
variables are functions of shocks that a¤ect the economy.
Moreover, we dene the price change in the traded sector as H =
PH;t
PH;t 1
and that
in the non-traded sector as  N = PN;tPN;t 1 ; consequently, the producer price ination
rates in the traded and non-traded sectors are H;t  ln

PH;t
PH;t 1

and N;t  ln

PN;t
PN;t 1

,
respectively. We approximate the model around the steady state, in which producer
prices do not change, i.e., H =
PH;t
PH;t 1
= 1 and N =
PN;t
PN;t 1
= 1 at all times. A more
detailed description of the steady state is presented in the Appendix.
1.3.2 Log-Linearization of the Optimality Conditions
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions (4), (6)(10), and (12) and obtain the
following set of log-linear equations describing the dynamics of the multisectoral small
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open economy:
H;t = kH

bYH;t +  bCt + (1  ) bPFH;t +  bPNT;t + bH;t    bAH;t+ EtH;t+1;
(13)
N;t = kN

bYN;t +  bCt   (1  ) bPNT;t + bN;t    bAN;t+ EtN;t+1; (14)
bYH;t =  [ + (   !)] bPHT;t + ! bPNT;t +  bCt + w(1  )dERt + (1  ) bCt + bgH;t;
(15)
bYN;t = bCt   w(1  ) bPNT;t + bgN;t; (16)bCt = 1

dERt + bCt ; (17)
dERt =  bPFH;t    bPNT;t +  bP NT;t; (18)
 bPNT;t = N;t   H;t   (1  ) bPFH;t: (19)
Moreover, from the price index relation (1a) we note that:
bPHT;t =  (1  ) bPFH;t: (19a)
The Phillips curve relations in the two sectors are presented by equations (13) and (14),
where kL =
(1 L)(1 L)
L(1+)
is the constant that measures the response of the sectoral in-
ation rates to variations in real marginal costs. The characterization of real marginal
costs in the open economy setting di¤ers from that of the closed economy due to the
gap between production and consumption as well as to the impact of relative prices,
which reect the distinction between domestic and consumer prices. An improvement
in the terms of trade (a decrease in bPFH ) or a positive productivity shock results in a
fall in marginal costs in the traded sector. The marginal costs in the non-traded sector
are independent of direct changes in the terms of trade. However, the sectoral marginal
costs are linked through the relative prices of non-traded goods. This impact is opposite
in sign and symmetric in magnitude. Producerspricing decisions are forward-looking
due to price stickiness. As a result, the Phillips curve takes the expectation-augmented
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form. Equations (15) and (16) describe the aggregate demand for domestic goods in
the two sectors. We consider bCt as a term that cannot be a¤ected by dynamics in the
home country. This variable is exogenous from the small open economy perspective.
Relation (17) is the log-linearized optimal risk-sharing condition. It describes varia-
tions in domestic consumption depending on uctuations in the real exchange rate and
consumption abroad. Equation (18), which is derived from (12), summarizes the deter-
minants of the real exchange rate. Again, the relative price of non-traded goods in the
foreign country is treated as exogenous. This equation illustrates the implication of the
multisectoral economic structure. In particular, changes in the terms of trade do not
necessarily imply a corresponding adjustment of the exchange rate, due to the impact
of the relative prices of non-traded goods at home and abroad. Finally, expression (19),
which is in fact an identity, is obtained from the denitions of non-traded and traded
goods ination and describes the evolution of the price indexes for both sectors. The
equation that characterizes traded goods ination is presented in the next sub-section.
1.3.3 Domestic Ination, CPI Ination, and Some Aggrega-
tion Results
In this sub-section, we present several useful denitions and identities, which will be
used in the subsequent analysis. Log-linearization of price indexes (1) and (1a) yields :
bPt =  bPN;t + (1  ) bPT;t (20)bPT;t =  bPH;t + (1  ) bPF;t: (21)
Applying the denition of ination t = ln

Pt
Pt 1

= bPt   bPt 1; we obtain the expres-
sions for CPI ination and traded ination:
t = N;t + (1  )T;t (22)
T;t = H;t + (1  )F;t: (23)
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Moreover, the denition of the terms of trade implies that F;t =  bPFH;t + H;t.
The combination of the equations presented above results in the following relationship
between CPI and domestic ination:
t = 
D
t + (1  )(1  ) bPFH;t; (24)
where domestic ination equals:
Dt = N;t + (1  )H;t: (25)
Total output is given by:
PtYt = PN;tYN;t + PH;tYH;t: (26)
Log-linearization of equation (26) yields:
bYt =  bYN;t + (1  )bYH;t   (1  )(1  ) bPFH;t: (26a)
This relation implies that in an open multi-sectoral economy, aggregate output is not
only the weighted average of the sectoral outputs, but also a function of relative prices.
Moreover, the evolution of the nominal exchange rate is derived from the denition
of the real exchange rate and takes the form:
dERt  dERt 1 = bSt   bSt 1 + t   t; (27)
where bSt is the nominal exchange rate, and t is CPI ination for the foreign country.
We assume that the monetary authority abroad is implementing an ination-targeting
policy, and thus, t = 0. Such an assumption is common in the small open economy
literature (Gali and Monacelli, 2005).
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1.4 The Monetary Policy Problem and Welfare
This section will present the formulation of the monetary policy strategy and an analy-
sis of the competing objectives of the central bank. We will see that the model spec-
ication implies deviations of the optimal monetary policy from complete price sta-
bilization. Specically, we present a formal welfare analysis and derive the objective
function of the central bank based on a second-order approximation of both the house-
holds utility and the structural equilibrium conditions (13)(19). Optimal monetary
strategy involves the maximization of the quadratic social welfare function (a mini-
mization of the loss function) subject to linear constraints. Monetary policy is able
to achieve the best outcome from the welfare perspective by implementing the opti-
mal plan. In this analysis, we focus on optimal targeting rules, which are strongly
advocated by Svensson and Woodford.
1.4.1 The Objective Function of the Central Bank for an Open
Economy with Multiple Domestic Sectors
In order to obtain the analytical expression for welfare in a purely quadratic form, we
apply the linear-quadratic solution methods described in Woodford (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2005). This approach is based on the idea presented in Sutherland
(2002) to explore the dynamic characteristics of the model and thus to account for the
impact of the second moments of the variables on their levels. The derivation of the
objective function of the central bank is presented in the Mathematical Appendix. We
show that the utility function of the representative household can be approximated by
the following expression:
Wto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 (28)
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266666664
bCt   (N) 1 bYN;t   (H) 1(1  )bYH;t + 12(1  ) bC2t
 1
2
(N)
 1(1 + )bY 2N;t   12(H) 1(1  )(1 + )bY 2H;t
+(N)
 1 bAN;tbYN;t + (H) 1(1  ) bAH;tbYH;t
 1
2
 
NkN
2N;t   12(1  ) HkH 
2
H;t:+ t:i:p+ (
3)
377777775
:
We eliminate the linear terms in the objective function by using a second-order ap-
proximation of the equilibrium structural equations (1319). As a result, we obtain an
objective function that is purely quadratic. The expression takes the following form:
Lto = UCCEto
1X
t=t0
t t0 (29)266664
1
2
WYN (
bYN;t   bY TN;t)2 + 12WYH (bYH;t   bY TH;t)2 + 12WER(dERt  dERTt )2
+1
2
WPNT (
bPNT;t   ( bP TNT;t)2 +WYNYH (bYN;t   bY TN;t)(bYH;t   bY TH;t)
+WER;PNT (
dERt  dERTt )( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + 12WN (N;t)2 + 12WH (H;t)2
377775+ t:i:p;
where bY TN;t, bY TH;t,dERTt , and bP TNT;t are welfare-relevant target variables, which are func-
tions of stochastic shocks and, in general, may not be identical to the exible price
allocations.
Equation (29) implies that the social welfare of the two-sector, small open economy
is a¤ected by deviations in the sectoral ination rates, output gaps, and relative prices
from their target values.
In fact, the objective function reects the impact of various economic distortions
on social welfare and illustrates their relative contributions to the loss. First of all,
price rigidities and monopolistic distortions in both sectors, which may not be fully
o¤set by production subsidies, result in economic ine¢ ciencies and introduce a role for
ination and output gap stabilization. The cross-output variable (bYN;t   bY TN;t)(bYH;t  bY TH;t) describes the impact of co-movement in the sectoral output gaps on social welfare.
When the weight in the objective function associated with the interaction term is
positive, the sectoral asymmetries might be welfare improving. When this weight is
25
negative, a co-movement of the sectoral outputs reduces welfare losses. In general, the
weights next to each of the quadratic terms are represented by complicated functions
of the structural parameters of the model (details are presented in the Appendix).
Furthermore, when price rigidities are present in both sectors and domestic shocks
are imperfectly correlated, price changes are not synchronized following a shock. This
results in ine¢ cient output dispersion between sectors and introduces a role for relative
prices into the monetary policy design problem. In this case, not only do the levels
of ination in both sectors matter for welfare, but so does the deviation of the rela-
tive price from its target level. The open economy formulation brings an additional,
cross-country, dimension into the problem described above. Specically, nominal rigidi-
ties may prevent prices in both countries from adjusting e¢ ciently after exchange rate
movements. In other words, the so-called relative price channel can fail to function ac-
curately; this may result in welfare gains from exchange rate stabilization. On the other
hand, in an open economy the policymaker can manipulate the terms of trade in order to
increase expected consumption and decrease the expected disutility of production, i.e.,
to improve welfare. Those incentives are called the terms of trade externality and were
analyzed by Benigno and Benigno (2006). Therefore, the weight next to the exchange
rate term in the loss function balances the stability objective determined by the eco-
nomic distortions (nominal rigidities) with the incentive of creating additional volatility
in excess of the fundamental shocks. The cross factor (dERt dERTt )( bPNT;t  bP TNT;t) rep-
resents another "international dimension" term, which appears due to the fact that
the relative price of non-traded to traded goods partially drives the evolution of the
real exchange rate. This term, therefore, describes the additional welfare e¤ects that
originate from the correlation between the two relative prices.
Equation (29) indicates that the loss function derived for our model specication is
not identical to the one of the closed economy or to the loss function obtained under
the assumption  =  = ! = 1: The general welfare representation, however, embodies
these two special cases, which coincide in terms of policy objectives and imply that
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WYNYH = 0 and WER = WPNT = WER;PNT = 0.
The presence of open economy terms is not the only implication of the exposure to
external factors that can be observed in the objective function. The relative weights
on the sectoral ination rates and output gaps are not only a¤ected by the structural
asymmetries, like in the case of the closed economy, but also display the incentives that
arise under openness to trade of one of the domestic sectors. Specically, in an open
economy, the weights in the objective function imply relatively higher stabilization of
the non-traded sector compared to the traded sector variables. Figures 1.1 and 1.2
present the weights on ination rates and output gaps as functions of the non-traded
sector size derived for the closed and open economies, respectively. The weights are
computed under the baseline parameterization, for illustration purpose the nominal
price rigidities are assumed to be equal across sectors and are set to the value 0.66.
Figure 1.1: Sector-Specic Weights for the Closed Economy Model
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
g
W
Y
H
, W
Y
N
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
50
100
150
g
W
p H
, W
p N
WY
H
WY
N
W
p
H
W
p
N
Figure 1.2: Sector-Specic Weights for the Open Economy Model
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Two important results can be highlighted when analyzing Figures 1.1 and 1.2. First,
these graphs indicate that both sectors are more volatile under the optimal policy
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when the economy is open (the weights are lower for all values of ). Secondly, the
decomposition of weights between sectors changes depending on whether the economy
is subject to external factors. In particular, Figure 1.1 indicates that the weights
derived for the closed economy model are symmetric and determined mainly by the
parameter  (under the equal stickiness of prices). The equal size of both sectors
( = 0:5) implies their equal contribution to the loss function. In contrast, Figure 1.2
demonstrates that in the open economy, the stabilization "bias" is shifted toward the
non-traded sector. In other words, the sector that is open to trade is allowed to adjust
more at the optimum compared to the sector that produces goods only for internal
consumption. Such a result can be explained by incentives that arise in the open
economy. In particular, domestic households can benet from volatility in the traded
sector by varying consumption of imported goods and domestic output in response
to shocks. The possibility to substitute for foreign goods in the consumption basket
provides the mechanism to hedge against unfavorable economic conditions. Households
are able to "divert" a part of production abroad and thus to lower the costs of the home-
goods ination and reduce the economic ine¢ ciencies. Moreover, in the open economy,
there exists the motivation to explore the terms of trade externality, i.e. to manage
the relative prices (both internal and external) in a welfare improving manner. This
e¤ect is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded
goods . The similar mechanism applies to the non-traded sector. Higher elasticity
of substitution between two types of domestic goods w (in the baseline calibration
is assumed to be small and equal to 0:5) would involve relatively lower weights on
non-tradable ination and output in the loss function and thus more volatile dynamics
of these variables under the optimal policy. Note, that in the loss function derived
under the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitutions and logarithmic preferences
( =  = ! = 1), the weights on ination and output are independent on  and w, and
welfare e¤ects describe above vanish.
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1.4.2 The Relevance of the Welfare-Based Objective Function
to the Current Practice of Central Banks
The loss functions widely assumed in the literature on monetary policy are typically
represented by a quadratic expression that includes a weighted combination of ination
(CPI or domestic) and total output gap terms. Analyzing the micro-founded welfare
objective function (29) we can see that it di¤ers from the ad hoc forms in two important
respects. First of all, it includes an open economy term and, therefore, prescribes a
certain degree of exchange rate management. Secondly, it reects the multisectoral
economic structure and di¤erentiates between sector-specic ination rates and output
gaps. Thus, the loss function derived on the basis of the economic fundamentals appears
to be signicantly more complex than the ad hoc policy objectives.
It is important to clarify why the objective function (29) does not explicitly display
an important practical feature of current monetary policy conduct. Specically, the
majority of the central banks which have adopted ination targeting as an operational
framework have specied their monetary policy objective in terms of CPI ination.
Equation (29) indicates that the welfare loss of a small open economy depends on the
appropriate measure of domestic ination rates and is not explicitly a¤ected by import
price ination. On the other hand, equation (25) illustrates the role of relative prices
in movements of the foreign ination rate. Thus, the welfare-based objective function
indirectly includes all components of CPI ination (except the lagged relative prices)
but with the optimal weights.
At the same time it is possible to describe the conditions under which the explicit
F;t term can appear in the loss function. In the most general case, the loss function
captures the distortions present in the domestic economy as well as the interrelations
with the rest of the world. In particular, when countries are big enough, economic de-
velopments in the neighboring economy can a¤ect domestic welfare and vice versa. The
set of structural constraints for each country includes, in this case, both the domestic
and foreign equations. Since the quadratic welfare objective function is derived from
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the approximation of the welfare function and the structural equations, the interaction
between economies can bring foreign variables into the loss function of the domestic
economy with country-specic weights. Such a framework is presented in Benigno and
Benigno (2006), where they consider a two-country model with countries of comparable
size. This paper demonstrates that despite the non-zero weight on foreign ination in
the loss function, the optimal targeting rules suggest a certain role for CPI ination
only in the case of cooperation between countries. Such a result can be explained by
the fact that under the Nash regime (the non-cooperative case) the objective function
is minimized only with respect to domestic variables, and the strategy of the other
policymaker and the sequence of the foreign ination rate are taken as given. In other
words, the monetary authority does not care about the impact of domestic policy on
the other country. In the cooperative case, the e¤ects of the actions in both coun-
tries are internalized and the social planner optimizes with respect to all endogenous
variables (domestic and foreign). As a result, the optimal targeting rule contains the
proper measure of world ination, which brings a role for CPI targeting.
Coming back to the model presented in this paper, the small open economy frame-
work and, more specically, the limiting case (n! 0) imply that the domestic economy
cannot inuence the foreign country because of its small size, and the rest of the world
can be treated as a closed economy. In this sense, countries are not directly interre-
lated in terms of consumption and production. The set of structural constraints for
country H contains only the domestic equations and the foreign variables are treated as
exogenous from the small open economy perspective. The implications of the foreign
variables as well as other structural shocks can be observed in the targets, the devia-
tions from which the central bank is trying to minimize. All other e¤ects of the foreign
dynamics are out of the control of the domestic policymaker and can be interpreted as
unavoidable losses or as terms that are independent of policy.
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1.4.3 The Optimal Monetary Policy Rules
In order to obtain the optimal targeting policy rules, we minimize the objective function
(29) subject to the set of constraints, which are given by:
H;t = kH

(bYH;t   bY TH;t) + 1 (dERt  dERTt ) +  ( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + uHt

+ EtH;t+1;
(30)
N;t = kN
h
(bYN;t   bY TN;t) + (dERt  dERTt )  (1  )( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + uNt i+ EtN;t+1;
(31)
(bYH;t   bY TH;t) = l + 1 (dERt  dERTt ) + 

(l + 1) + 2(!   1)


( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + Ht ;
(32)
(bYN;t   bY TN;t) = 1(dERt  dERTt )  !(1  )( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + Nt ; (33)
(1  )(dERt  dERTt ) = (N;t   H;t)  ( + (1  ))( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + "t; (34)
where l = (   1)(1   )(1 + ), and the terms uHt ; uNt ; Ht ; Nt ; "t are functions of
exogenous shocks and arise when the target levels of variables and exible price allo-
cations diverge. The conditions (30)(34) are obtained by combining the log-linearized
equilibrium conditions (13)(19) and expressing the relations in terms of gap variables.
We assume that the central bank can commit to the policy that maximizes welfare
and consider the timeless perspective approach described in Woodford (2003). The
timeless perspective optimal policy assigns the particular value to the commitment to
expectations prior to period 0. The constraints on the initial conditions result in the
time-invariant rst-order conditions and thus optimal policy. Therefore, the time incon-
sistency problem is eliminated. Following such a strategy, the policymaker chooses the
path for endogenous variables H;t, N;t, bYH;t, bYN;t, dERt, bPNT;t subject to constraints
(30)(34) and given the initial conditions on Ho, No, bYHo, bYNo. The Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the set of constraints are 1;t   5;t respectively. In addition
before the optimization, we divided equation (30) by kH , equation (31) by kN , and
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equation (34) by . The rst-order conditions to the problem are given by:
WHkHH;t = 1;t   1;t 1 + 5;tkH ; (35)
WNkNN;t = 2;t   2;t 1   5;tkN ; (36)
WYH (
bYH;t   bY TH;t) +WYNYH (bYN;t   bY TN;t) = 3;t   1;t; (37)
WYN (
bYN;t   bY TN;t) +WYNYH (bYH;t   bY TH;t) = 4;t   2;t; (38)
WER(dERt  dERTt ) +WER;PNT ( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) = (39)
 1

1;t   2;t   (l + 1)

3;t   1

4;t +
1  

(5;t   5;t+1)
WPNT (
bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) +WER;PNT (dERt  dERTt ) =  1;t + (1  )2;t  (40)
 (l + 1 + 
2(!   1))

3;t + !(1  )4;t +

1 +
(1  )


(5;t   5;t+1):
Combining equations (35)(40), we can eliminate the Lagrange multipliers and express
the optimal policy rule in the following general form:
A0 eXt + A1 eXt 1 + A2 eXt+1 = 0; (41)
where A0; A1; A2 are the matrices of parameters,  eXt = eXt  eXt 1; and eXt = bXt  bXTt ,
i.e., eXt denotes the vector of the endogenous variables (H;t, N;t, bYH;t, bYN;t,dERt, bPNT;t)
in deviations from their target values. Therefore, the optimal policy rule is represented
by a fairly complicated expression that prescribes the response to deviations in the
sectoral ination rates and output gaps as well as to uctuations in relative prices.
The reaction function (41) includes both backward and forward-looking endogenous
variables. The matrices of the parameters A, which describe the optimal magnitude
of the response, depend on the optimal weights and the structural parameters of the
model.
For comparison, the optimal policy rule derived with the use of the similar method-
ology for the one-sector, open economy model takes the general form: A0 eXt = 0.
Therefore, the multi-sectoral model specication brings in more complex dynamics of
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variables under the optimal policy. Specically, rule (41) is more persistent, i.e., it
prescribes the response to the rst and the second lag of the endogenous variables.
Moreover, the rule contains forward-looking components since A2 6= 0. The character-
istics of the policy rule mentioned above are determined by the persistent structure of
one of the model equations (34), which describes the evolution of the sector-specic
ination rates and the two types of relative prices.
1.4.4 Policy Trade-O¤s
The welfare function (29) indicates that the monetary authority is confronted with sev-
eral policy objectives. In particular, the central bank has to control the sector-specic
ination rates and output gaps, as well as relative prices. In order to study the optimal
plan, it is important to investigate whether the policy goals can be simultaneously at-
tained or the central bank has to decide how to balance them appropriately. Where the
objectives do not conict with each other, the central bank can achieve the rst best
allocation and completely eliminate the loss. In this section, we describe the policy
trade-o¤s that arise in a generalized model of a two-sector, small open economy.
We analyze the combination of equations (18) and (19) expressed in terms of the
welfare-relevant gap variables:
(1  )(dERt  dERTt ) = (N;t   H;t)  ( + (1  ))( bPNT;t   bP TNT;t) + "t: (42)
The gaps depend on the target levels of the variables, which in turn are functions of
the shocks and parameters and vary over time. Equation (42) indicates that it is not
possible to stabilize ination rates in each sector and to eliminate the gaps between
relative prices and their target values at the same time. In fact, relative prices act as
endogenous shocks that do not allow the same policy to attain zero ination in both
sectors. For example, under a productivity shock in the non-traded goods sector (Figure
4), the optimal policy implies depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Complete
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stability of non-traded ination would require an even larger increase in the exchange
rate. This, however, would result in a further worsening of the terms of trade and a
greater rise in home-goods ination. A similar trade-o¤exists under scal and mark-up
shocks. Moreover, the impulse-responses indicate that the magnitude of the response
di¤ers across sector-specic variables. The di¤erent sensitivity of the domestic sectors
to shocks is determined not only by structural asymmetries such as sector size, elasticity
of substitution, and the level of nominal rigidities, but also by the openness to trade
of one of the domestic sectors. Therefore, the optimal policy cannot comply with all
the sector-specic stabilization objectives simultaneously. Woodford (2003) illustrates
that a corresponding trade-o¤ also exists in the closed economy model (=1) if the
target rate of the relative price (the natural rate) is not constant.
Furthermore, we address the question of whether complete stability of the aggregate
variables is attainable under the given economic structure. We present the Phillips
curve relations in terms of gap variables and use the denition of domestic ination.
Moreover, in this analysis we assume for simplicity that the target variables and exible
price allocations coincide and the degree of nominal rigidities is equal across sectors.
We combine the constraints (30)(33) and apply the denition of domestic ination
(25). As a result, the following relationship arises:
Dt = k
264 ( + )

(bYN;t   bY flexN;t ) + (1  )(bYH;t   bY flexH;t ) 
(1 )

l(dERt  dERflext )  (1 ) el( bPNT;t   bP flexNT;t)
375+ EtDt+1; (43)
where l = (   1)(1   )(1 + ) , el = l   (!   1)(1   ) , and the exible price
allocations of the variables are functions of the exogenous shocks bAH;t; bAN;t; bP NT;t; Ct :
Moreover, we make use of equation (26a) and provide the alternative domestic Phillips
curve relation in order to analyze the impact of the aggregate output gap instead of
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the di¤erentiation between the sectoral variables:
Dt = k
264 ( + )

(bYt   bY flext ) + (1  )(1  )( bPFH;t   bP flexFH;t) 
(1 )

l(dERt  dERflext )  (1 ) el( bPNT;t   bP flexNT;t)
375+ EtDt+1:
(44)
We present two special cases of our more general analysis in order to describe the role
of relative prices in generating the policy trade-o¤s. First, we consider a two-sector,
closed-economy setting, i.e.,  = 1;  > 0. In such a situation l = el = 0. Equations (43)
and (44) illustrate that the sectoral Phillips curves reduce to the classical aggregate
relation, which, at the same time, describes the dynamics for the one-sector, closed
economy. Therefore, there is no conict between ination and output gap stabilization,
and optimal monetary policy is able to implement the rst best, i.e., exible price
allocation. This result has been shown by Woodford (2003).
Secondly, we assume the special case of unitary elasticity of substitution and a
unitary coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, i.e., the balanced trade model specication
as in Liu and Pappa (2005). Again, we have l = el = 0. Thus, the exchange rate
and relative prices vanish from the Phillips curve relations (43) and (44). Moreover,
the assumption  =  = ! = 1 implies that the exchange rate does not characterize
a welfare-relevant policy objective. In this situation, the terms of trade act as an
endogenous "cost-push shock," which generates tension between domestic ination and
the output gap. In fact, such a trade-o¤ can be generated in closed economy models
in the presence of mark-up shocks or adjustment costs (Benigno and Woodford, 2005;
Erceg and Levin, 2006).
Finally, we consider a two-sector model under general preferences. The Phillips
curve (43) illustrates that the stabilization of domestic ination and outputs in both
sectors does not involve equivalent policies due to the presence of relative prices. More-
over, equation (44) indicates that there is tension between domestic ination and rel-
ative price (internal and external,i.e. the exchange rate) stability in addition to the
trade-o¤ between domestic ination and the aggregate output gap variability. There-
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fore, unless preferences are specied in the general form, the conict between managing
domestic ination and the relative prices ceases to exist.
The fairly complex economic structure and general model specication determine
the non-trivial task facing policymakers, i.e., the search for the second-best optimal
policy given that the exible price e¢ cient allocation of resources cannot be replicated.
The optimal reaction function (41), in fact, represents such a second-best solution.
A similar result is obtained in the one-sector, open-economy model analyzed by De
Paoli (2006). In our case, however, the denition of the real exchange rate implies a
distinction between the two types of relative prices and enables us to characterize the
dynamics and impact of each variable separately. Moreover, the multiple sectors imply
an additional policy challenge, i.e., the proper management of the "between-sector"
terms.
1.5 Impulse-Response Functions
In this section we examine the impulse-responses of key macroeconomic variables to ex-
ogenous shocks. Specically, we compare the numerical results under the optimal plan
with the outcomes achieved under the basic simple rules common in the literature,
such as domestic ination targeting (DIT), consumer price index ination targeting
(CPIT), and an exchange rate peg (PEG). We consider four types of shocks, i.e., pro-
ductivity, foreign, scal, and mark-up shocks. For the numerical exercise we calibrate
the model parameters to match the moments of Canadian data (Table 2). We assume
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  = 3 and the elasticity of substitution between
di¤erentiated goods  = 6 as in Benigno and Benigno (2006). Following Rotenberg and
Woodford (1997) we set  = 0:99 and  = 0:47. The elasticity of substitution between
traded home and foreign goods  is assumed to be equal to 1:5 and the parameter that
measures the substitution between non-traded and traded goods ! is set to 0:5. These
assumptions are common in the open economy literature. The level of price rigidities
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in tradable sector is set to H = 0:55 and in non-tradable sector the Calvo parameter
is assumed to be somewhat higher and equal to N = 0:6. The share of non-traded
goods in the consumption basket  is set to 0.5. The corresponding parameter for the
foreign country  = 0:6: The degree of openness  = 0:6, implying a 40% import share.
Finally, the steady state mark-up in the traded sector H is set to the value 1= as in
Liu and Pappa (2005) and De Paoli (2006) in order to guarantee the optimal subsidy
policy. In addition, the equal size of both domestic sectors implies that H = N :
The calibration of the parameters of stochastic processes and the policy rule are based
on Dib (2008) and Ortega and Rebei (2006), who performed the Bayesian estimation
of multi-sectoral DSGE models of Canadian economy. The calibrated parameters are
summarized in the Table 1.
Figure 1.3 represents the impulse-responses to a productivity shock in the traded
sector, bAH . All regimes (except PEG) imply a reaction of the monetary authority that
induces a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Such dynamics, together with
a fall in the price of home goods, worsen the terms of trade and thus result in a real
depreciation. The increase in the exchange rate is the largest under DIT, because in
this case the central bank stabilizes ination more aggressively. In fact, higher home-
goods ination stability is traded for some additional exchange rate volatility. CPI
ination rises under DIT and the optimal plan. Under PEG, the nominal exchange
rate is stable and the e¤ect of the productivity shock on CPI ination is determined
by the fall in ination in the home-goods sector. Domestic output increases due to
the real exchange rate depreciation. Domestic goods become relatively cheaper than
foreign goods. However, the increase in output is not large enough to boost production
above its target level and the total impact on the output gap is negative. The expen-
diture switching e¤ect is the most pronounced under the DIT regime, which implies
no control over the exchange rate and thus allows for greater real depreciation. As a
result, the output response is the largest. On the contrary, under PEG and CPIT the
expenditure switching e¤ect is minimized and the output gap falls by more compared
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to the other regimes. The negative response of home-goods ination under all the
regimes is determined by the direct impact of the productivity shock, which lowers the
marginal costs in this sector. However, the marginal costs in the non-tradable sector
increase. Non-traded output increases and the relative price of non-traded to traded
goods bPNT falls under DIT and the optimal plan, due to nominal depreciation. As a
result, non-traded ination rises.
Figure 1.4 presents the impulse-response to a productivity shock in the non-traded
sector, bAN . The dynamics of the variables can be described in a similar fashion. It is
important to note that non-traded ination is stabilized to a greater extent under the
optimal plan compared to the alternative simple rules. The reason for such a policy
reaction is that the optimal welfare function assigns the greatest weight to stabilization
of non-traded ination. At the same time, the productivity shock bAN directly a¤ects
the price change in this sector and, hence, induces greater dynamics of this variable. In
order to prevent large swings in non-traded ination, the central bank allows greater
adjustments in relative prices and output. In addition, the response of relative prices
( bPNT and dER) is almost two times stronger than the responses of these variables
following the productivity shock bAH . Again, the reason is that instability of non-
traded ination has larger negative welfare consequences than changes in home-goods
ination. The output reaction is positive in both sectors due to the large expenditure
switching e¤ect under DIT and the optimal plan. Unlike the negative response of the
output gap following the productivity shock in the home-goods sector, the bAN shock
results in an increase of output above its target level due to the more expansionary
policy.
Figure 1.5 presents the responses of domestic variables to the innovation in foreign
consumption, bC. We can observe that the DIT regime is very similar to the optimal
plan in terms of the direction and magnitude of the response. The foreign consumption
shock risess domestic consumption through the risk-sharing condition. This, in turn,
may induce an increase in domestic output. At the same time, the nominal and real
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exchange rates appreciate and the terms of trade fall. Domestic goods become relatively
less competitive and demand shifts to foreign goods. The net e¤ect on home output
is negative under DIT and the optimal plan. The impact of the shock on the macro-
variables is qualitatively di¤erent under the CPIT and PEG regimes. Specically,
the monetary authority stabilizes relative prices and the real appreciation is small.
The expenditure switching e¤ect is dominated by the positive impact of the shock on
domestic consumption and demand. As a result, the outputs in both sectors as well
as the output gap show a signicant increase. Such a boost in production increases
marginal costs, and ination in both sectors rises.
Figure 1.6 presents the impulse-responses to a shock to foreign relative prices, bP NT .
The DIT regime almost perfectly replicates the optimal response. The policy reaction
following the bP NT shock displays a sharp contrast between the responses under the
CPIT and PEG regimes, whereas under the other types of shocks these two regimes
induce very similar changes in economic activity. Specically, under the CPIT regime
the central bank prevents large movements in the terms of trade at the expense of addi-
tional domestic ination volatility. The policy implies a large nominal depreciation so
as to mitigate the negative impact of foreign prices on the terms of trade. The nominal
depreciation under the stabilized CPI ination results in real depreciation. This, in
turn, increases domestic production and ination in both sectors. On the contrary,
the PEG regime induces a policy that is closer to the optimal plan and DIT. When
foreign and home goods are substitutes, the optimal response implies a greater nominal
exchange rate stabilization in order to improve the terms of trade and divert produc-
tion abroad by switching to consumption of foreign goods. Such a policy is welfare
improving because it enables one to take advantage of the foreign productivity shock
by reducing domestic marginal costs and the ine¢ cient output dispersion associated
with price rigidities.
Figure 1.7 shows the impulse responses to a mark-up shock in the home-goods
sector, bH . The optimal policy diverges from complete domestic ination stabilization
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and the other alternative simple rules. The positive shock leads to a rise in home-
goods ination, which returns to its initial level after several periods of deation, and a
temporary fall in the output gap. The extent to which the shock a¤ects output versus
ination depends on the weight that the central bank places on output gap variability.
Specically, the optimal policy, unlike the alternative simple rules, implies a certain
degree of output gap stability. Therefore, ination is allowed to increase more and
the output gap to fall less under the optimal plan. The response of the monetary
authority to a mark-up shock implies fall in the nominal interest rate, depreciation of
the exchange rate, an increase in the terms of trade, and a fall in the relative price of
non-traded to traded goods. Outputs in both domestic sectors and consumption rise
in response to a shock. The output gap, however, falls due to the fall in home-goods
output below its target value.
The responses to a mark-up shock in the non-traded sector, bN , are presented
in gure 1.8. Again, the central bank has to balance conicting policy objectives 
to absorb the upward pressure on ination in the non-traded sector by a fall in the
output gap. The exchange rate appreciates and consumption and output decrease
under the optimal plan. The DIT regime implies a greater economic contraction and
thus the largest fall in output and consumption. CPIT and PEG represent strongly
suboptimal regimes because they induce excessive stabilization of relative prices and a
higher response of non-traded ination. The comparative analysis of impulse-responses
under the bH and bN shocks suggests that the optimal policy reacts more aggressively
under the disturbance to a non-traded mark-up.
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 illustrate the responses to scal shocks in the traded and non-
traded sectors, respectively. Again, the optimal policy di¤ers signicantly from the
simple policy rules. The rise in government spending bgH increases home-goods output.
The central bank, which aims at domestic ination stabilization, o¤sets the upward
pressure on home-goods ination by a corresponding decrease in non-traded ination.
The response induces an initial appreciation of the exchange rate, a fall in the terms
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of trade, and a rise in the relative price of non-traded to traded goods. As a result,
consumption and non-traded output decrease. The optimal plan, on the contrary,
implies an expansionary policy. The exchange rate depreciates, implying an additional
stimulus to output in both domestic sectors. Such a policy prevents the initial drop in
consumption. The CPI and PEG regimes imply greater stability of relative prices.
The government spending shock bgN increases non-traded output and creates upward
pressure on non-traded ination. Therefore, unlike in the previous case, the optimal
policy implies the economic contraction. The response of the central bank is the most
aggressive compared to the alternative policy rules. As a result, greater non-traded
ination stability is achieved at the expense of additional volatility of ination and
output in the traded sector, as well as a larger adjustment of relative prices.
The analysis of the numerical results suggests that the type of shock and the eco-
nomic structure are important determinants of the comparative performance of optimal
versus simple policy rules. Specically, the responses under the optimal policy di¤er the
most from the simple rules under scal and mark-up shocks. On the contrary, the DIT
regime better approximates the optimal plan under foreign and productivity shocks.
In addition, the optimal and PEG regimes come closer under a foreign relative price
shock. Shocks of the same type but a¤ecting di¤erent domestic sectors may induce
qualitatively distinct economic responses. This happens due to the di¤erent sensitivity
of welfare-relevant economic variables to sector-specic shocks and greater stabilization
of the non-traded sector under the optimal policy. In particular, the optimal policy is
expansionary with respect to scal and mark-up shocks in the traded sector, whereas
identical shocks in the non-traded sector call for an economic contraction. The DIT
regime induces a more expansionary policy under a traded-sector productivity shock,
whereas the policy is less active following foreign shocks. Fiscal and mark-up distur-
bances result in an economic contraction under DIT. Under the CPI and PEG regimes,
the policy is less aggressive in response to domestic productivity shocks and it becomes
more expansionary under foreign shocks.
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1.6 Welfare Implications of the Alternative Simple
Rules
The study of the optimal policy problem presented in the previous sections provides a
useful theoretical foundation for the design of monetary strategy and o¤ers a rigorous
benchmark for comparing the performance of alternative monetary regimes. At the
same time, the prescriptions of the optimal policy given by expression (41) might be
too di¢ cult for the general public to interpret and too di¢ cult to put into practice.
Therefore, the analysis of the alternative policy rules, which deliver reasonable welfare
results and at the same time are simple and transparent, and the optimal rule, which
has normative implications, should interact in a complementary way in order to provide
benecial economic conclusions. In this section we enhance the analysis of the optimal
policy with a discussion of the alternative simple rules and present their comparative
performance. Specically, we use Dynare software in order to compute optimal simple
rules (OSRs) of the form: brt = rbrt 1 +  bXt + "r, where bXt is a vector of endogenous
variables,  is a vector of optimized parameters, and "r is a policy shock with standard
deviation set to 0:003:We also set the value of the parameter r to 0:75. In fact,
we compute the parameters of a policy rule which maximize a linear-quadratic loss
function (29) subject to constraints (30-34). As a result, we are able to analyze the
performance of rules with a simple structure but with optimal coe¢ cients.
We address two important issues. First, we consider several types of alternative
simple rules classied depending on the variables entering the rules and investigate the
extent to which alternative monetary regimes are able to replicate the optimal solution.
Secondly, we explore the implications of the alternative simple rules for macroeconomic
volatility.
The welfare ranking is performed on the basis of the value of the loss, which is com-
puted by taking the unconditional expectations of expression (29), i.e., the second-order
approximation to the utility of the representative consumer, expressed as a fraction of
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the steady state consumption. As a result, we present the value of the loss in terms of
the variances/covariances of the sector-specic ination rates, output gaps, and relative
prices:
V  1
2

1  
266664
WYNvar(
eYN;t) +WYHvar(eYH;t) + 2WYNYHcovar(eYN;teYH;t)+
+WERvar(gERt) +WPNT var( ePNT;t) + 2WER;PNT covar(gERt ePNT;t)+
+WNvar(N;t) +WHvar(H;t)
377775 :
(45)
Table 3 reports the welfare losses associated with various types of OSRs. Specically,
we consider simple rules which include domestic variables and rules that prescribe the
response to both closed and opened economy terms. In addition, we would like to evalu-
ate the benets of targeting sector-specic ination rates and outputs versus aggregate
variables. This issue is practically important since central banks do not usually di¤er-
entiate their policy response depending on the economic sector and consider aggregate
variables, due to the problem of policy implementation and a lack of information.
Table 3 indicates that the welfare losses under the OSRs that target domestic ina-
tion are on average 15-30% larger compared to the optimal rule. The losses associated
with strict CPI ination targeting are somewhat larger than rules that completely
stabilize the domestic ination. At the same time, certain forms of exible CPI tar-
geting may outperform exible DIT rules (compare rules 4,5 and 10,11). Targeting
the non-tradable ination provides better welfare results than DIT or CPI targeting
(rules 13 and 4,10). In general, the DIT regime performs worse compared to the results
obtained in the previous literature. In particular, in the special case of the open econ-
omy model presented in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and the framework with ad-hoc
welfare objectives as in Soto (2004), the DIT regime represents or nearly replicates
the rst-best. In our case, the presence of mark-up and government spending shocks
determines the deviation of optimal policy from the DIT. The ranking of alternative
regimes suggests that strict ination targeting (DIT or CPI) is suboptimal compared
to policies that account for other objectives, namely the interest rate smoothing, the
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output gap, and/or the relative prices. The rules that target the sector-specic vari-
ations in outputs and ination rates perform signicantly better compared to rules
targeting the aggregate variable. Thus stabilization of the appropriately weighted av-
erage of the sectoral ination rates (rule 12) produces better results than DIT or CPI.
At the same time, augmenting the rule that responds to the aggregate ination (do-
mestic or CPI) and total output gap with the relative price term allows one to better
account for sector-specic features of the economy. For example, rule 11 indicates that
exible CPI targeting regime that includes a certain degree of the internal relative
price management can achieve a welfare result that is close to the case of targeting the
sector-specic ination rates. Furthermore, across all types of rules (4 and 5, 10 and
11, 13 and 14), the internal relative prices do better job in capturing sector-specic
characteristics than external relative prices (the exchange rate). Thus the inclusion of
the relative price of non-traded goods in the policy rule brings higher welfare gains.
The improvement in welfare coming from the response to the change in the exchange
rate is higher for the CPI targeting rules because of the excess smoothness of relative
prices which this regime entails.
The values of the optimized coe¢ cients k1, k2, k3, and k4 displayed in table 3
provide information about the relative magnitude of the policy response to deviations
in key macroeconomic variables. Specically, the OSRs indicate that the policy should
respond more aggressively to variations in the non-traded sector variables (output and
ination rates).
The important criterion for evaluating the performance of the simple rules is the
level of macroeconomic stability which they induce. Alternative regimes may gener-
ate comparable welfare results but, at the same time, imply di¤erent volatility of the
macroeconomic variables. This issue becomes particularly important prior to enter-
ing the Eurozone, when the monetary authority has to fulll specic and sometimes
conicting stabilization objectives. Table 4 presents the standard deviations of the
key variables under di¤erent OSRs relative to the standard deviations implied by the
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optimal policy.
Comparing the volatility under the alternative regimes we note that the rules that
strictly target aggregate variables naturally perform the worst in terms of stabilization
of the particular economic sectors. Thus, under the DIT, CPI, and PEG regimes,
the volatility of the sector-specic variables diverges the most from the deviations
implied by the optimal rule. In particular, sectoral ination rates are 50% over (for
home ination) and about 2 times under-stabilized (for non-traded ination) under the
strict DIT regime. At the same time, the output gaps in the home-goods and non-
traded sectors are 10% and 17% respectively more volatile compared to their standard
deviations under the optimal policy. In all cases of strict ination targeting (rules
1,2,6,7,12), the fulllment of the ination objectives comes at the expense of somewhat
higher volatility of the output gap, at sector-specic and/or aggregate levels. The
comparison of DIT, CPI and the rule that targets the properly weighted domestic
ination index (rule 12) indicates that under the latter, the volatility of sector-specic
ination rates is closer to the optimal values and thus non-traded ination is less
volatile. At the same time relative prices and especially traded ination display higher
volatility. Greater stability of non-traded ination is achieved due to the di¤erent
magnitude of the optimal policy response with respect to the sectoral ination rates
expressed by the values of the parameters k1 and k2. The rules that do not di¤erentiate
the response across sectoral variables but instead incorporate the reaction to changes
in the relative prices (rules 5,10,11,13,14) allow the standard deviations of the sector-
specic ination rates to be brought closer to the optimal values. Such an improvement
can be achieved at the expense of increased domestic and/or CPI ination volatility as
well as the standard deviations of some of the relative prices. Moreover, regimes, which
display the features of an open economy, i.e., prescribes a certain degree of exchange
rate management (rules 4,16,17) bring higher stability of the CPI ination, but may
imply somewhat higher variation in output and domestic and non-tradable ination.
The results of this section demonstrate the tension between the sector-specic ina-
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tion objectives, ination and relative price stabilization as well as the ination-output
gap policy trade-o¤ common in the literature. We also numerically assess the welfare
benets of di¤erentiating the policy response depending on economic sectors compared
to stabilizing aggregate variables. Moreover, we show that the welfare results achieved
under the sector-specictargeting rules can be closely replicated by a rules with an
appropriate combination of aggregate variables, namely, the CPI ination, total out-
put gap and the internal relative price change. Responding to the relative prices may
facilitate targeting the sector-specic variables and contribute to welfare improvements
when the central bank does not have enough information about domestic sectors.
The exercise presented in this section has important practical implications. In par-
ticular, it could provide policymakers with a tool for analyzing the relative importance
(in terms of welfare consequences) of various monetary policy objectives and facilitate
the design of strategies aimed at achieving several competing goals.
1.7 Sensitivity analysis
1.7.1 Price stickiness
In the previous sections, we analyzed the performance of various policy rules under the
assumption that prices in the non-traded sector are more rigid compared to the level
of nominal rigidities in the traded sector. At the same time, the estimated values of
the parameters of price stickiness may vary across di¤erent studies even for the same
country. In this section, we would like to provide a more general analysis of the impact
of sectoral heterogeneity in the degree of price stickiness on the relative performance
of policy rules with sector-specic and aggregate variables (ination rates). In other
words, we would like to check how sectoral asymmetries a¤ect the optimal ination
index being stabilized. Moreover, we will compare the implications of asymmetric
nominal rigidities for closed and open economies. Specically, we compare our results
with conclusions derived by Aoki (2001) who studied the optimal policy in a two-
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sector closed economy model where prices are fully exible in one sector but sticky in
the other. His main result implies that the central bank should target the core ination
rather than changes of a broader price index.
For the sensitivity analysis we evaluate 5 types of rules: optimal policy, DIT and
CPI targeting with interest rate smoothing (rules 2 and 7), policy rule with sector-
specic ination rates (rule 12, which approximates the core ination), and the rules
which incorporate the response to the CPI or DIT inations and the relative price
change. We construct a measure of the sectoral asymmetries in relative price rigidities
0    1; = i
i+j
. It measures the level of price stickiness in a sector i relative to
the overall level of nominal rigidities. In the case that  = 0:5 is chosen, i = j i.e.
sectoral prices are equally sticky. This measure allows us to vary the assumed relative
stickiness of prices in the two sectors between the two extremes of complete exibility
in sector i (non-tradable, i = 0;  = 0) and complete exibility in sector j (tradable,
j = 0;  = 1). We compute welfare losses for values of  from 0 to 1, for each point
we consider all possible combinations of i and j and aggregate the results across all
options.
The results are presented on the Figures 1.11 and 1.12. We plot the welfare losses
under alternative policy regimes for various degrees of relative price rigidities. We
compute optimal and DIT policy for the closed economy as a special case of an open
economy, i.e. we assume that the share of imports is equal to zero (degree of openness)
and open economy shocks are shut o¤. Figures 1.11 and 1.12 indicate that implications
of equal degree of nominal rigidities across sectors ( = 0:5) di¤er for closed and open
economies. In particular, in the closed economy model where the sectoral prices are
equally sticky, the DIT policy is nearly optimal. At the same time, for values  < 0:5
or  > 0:5, targeting of aggregate price index is suboptimal. The central bank should
weigh the sectoral ination rates according to their price stickiness; the sector with
higher rigidities should be more stabilized at the optimum. This result corresponds to
the one shown by Aoki. The di¤erence (in terms of welfare) between the DIT and the
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optimal policy is higher on the interval where nominal rigidities in sector j are greater
than in sector i (  < 0:5). Such a result arises due to the assumption of asymmetric
disturbances, which greater a¤ect the sector j . In case of identical sector-specic
shocks the welfare losses following the DIT policy would be symmetric on the intervals
 < 0:5 and  > 0:5 because, in the closed economy, volatilities in domestic sectors
equally contribute to the welfare loss function.
The results obtained for the open economy model indicate that equality of sectoral
price rigidities does not imply the optimality of targeting the aggregate ination indices
(CPI or domestic). At the same time, the regimes that stabilize the measures of
sector-specic and aggregate inations produce similar welfare results on the interval
0:1    0:4. In particular, for  = 0:2 0:3 there are almost no gains from targeting
sector-specic versus domestic ination rates. This implies that the optimal policy in
the open economy may prescribe the equivalent response to changes in sectoral price
indices even if sectoral nominal rigidities are asymmetric (prices in the non-tradable
sector are more exible). Such a result is obtained because, in general, the non-tradable
ination has to be more stabilized under the optimal policy relative to the tradable
ination. The gain from targeting sector-specic versus aggregate ination rates is
increasing on the interval  > 0:4, where prices in sector i (non-tradable) become
stickier and the discrepancy between optimal weights assigned to sectoral inations is
increasing. Moreover, in this case exible CPI targeting outperforms the corresponding
regime of domestic ination stabilization (see Figure 1.13, left panel). For all values
of relative price stickiness, the policy rule that combines CPI with the relative price
management is able to closely replicate the optimal solution and the "core" ination
(sector-specic) rule. In addition, Figure 1.11 indicates that nominal rigidities in non-
tradable sector are more costly comparing to the case when prices in the tradable sector
are stickier (the point where  = 0 implies lower welfare losses compared to the point
 = 1). This result indicates that greater stability of non-tradable ination comes at
the expense of higher volatility of other welfare relevant variables. The stabilization of
48
tradable ination generates less severe volatility trade-o¤s.
1.7.2 Degree of openness and elasticity of substitution
In this paper we have demonstrated that openness to trade as well as the general
specication of consumer preferences generate important welfare e¤ects in a multi-
sectoral small open economy model. Therefore, it is useful to understand how the
results could change depending on the di¤erent values of these parameters. Specically,
we vary the parameter that determines the preferences of agents in country H for the
consumption of goods produced at Home, i.e. the degree of openness , from 0.1 (very
open economy) to 1 (completely closed economy). We perform the analogous exercise as
in the previous subsection in order to evaluate welfare gains from targeting the "core"
versus broader (DIT) ination index. In addition, we compare welfare implications of
exible CPI and DIT regimes. For this analysis we consider  = 1, H = N = 0:66,
and the rest of the parameters are xed at their calibrated values. Figure 1.13 (right
panel) displays the results. In particular, the gains from targeting the "core" ination
in the open economy (for all  < 1) are positive (relatively to both the CPI and DIT)
even under the same sector size and the price stickiness, in contrast to the zero gains for
the closed economy. The higher degree of openness implies the greater benets from the
stabilization of appropriately weighted ination index compared to DIT regime. For
relatively closed economies, stability of the domestic ination delivers better welfare
results than the CPI targeting, but the opposite is true for more open economies.
Figure 1.14 (left panel) displays welfare gains from targeting the alternative price
indices as a function of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
. The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods is kept at its
calibrated value (0.5). The results suggest that the gain from targeting the core rather
than the aggregate price index is increasing when domestic households receive a greater
opportunity to substitute for foreign goods in the consumption basket. For higher
values of  , the optimal volatility of tradable ination and output risess relatively to
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the volatility of non-tradable sector variables and it becomes more important to account
for such an increased discrepancy between sectors. Comparing the performance of CPI
versus DIT regimes we notice that for home and foreign goods that are complements
the targeting of the domestic ination strongly outperforms the CPI. As the elasticity
of substitutes rises, the gains form switching to CPI targeting regime become more
sizable.
Figure 1.14 (right panel) presents the similar welfare analysis depending on the
preference parameter !;  is xed at the calibrated value 1:5. The graph indicates
that benets from di¤erentiating the response between sectoral ination rates diminish
with the increasing elasticity of substitution of non-tradables. This happens due to the
fact that non-tradable ination becomes less heavily weighted in the welfare objective
function and the optimal volatilities in both sectors converge. Moreover, for ! higher
than 0:9, the DIT regime is a better approximation of the optimal policy comparing
to CPI. Note that for the special case of unitary elasticity of , the domestic ination
targeting regime would basically reproduce the core index and outperform the con-
sumer price ination stabilization for all considered values of !. From this analysis we
also notice that welfare implications of heterogeneity between the elasticity of substi-
tution parameters ( and !) di¤er depending on which type of goods becomes more
substitutes. In case when the sectoral elasticities diverge due to the increase in , the
"core" ination targeting does better job in replicating the optimal solution. As the
structural asymmetries rise due to higher elasticity of substitution of non-tradables,
the DIT regime delivers higher welfare.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the stabilization objectives of optimal monetary policy in
a two-sector small open economy model obtained as a limiting case of a two-country
DSGE framework. We assessed the role of sectoral heterogeneity, general preferences,
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and multiple relative prices for monetary policy design and welfare evaluation. The
stabilization objectives derived for our model specication and represented by the loss
function display the features of an open economy and reect a multisectoral economic
structure. Specically, it is shown that social welfare is a¤ected by deviations in in-
ation rates and output gaps (with sector-specic weights) as well as in relative prices
from their target values. Therefore, the micro-founded welfare objective function dif-
fers from the ad hoc forms widely assumed in the applied literature. The exposure of
one of the domestic sectors to the external environment not only determines the pres-
ence of open economy terms in the loss function, but also a¤ects the decomposition of
weights between domestic variables. In particular, the sector that is open to trade is
allowed to adjust more at the optimum compared to the sector that produces goods
for internal consumption only. Such a result implies a qualitatively di¤erent policy
response to deviations in sector-specic variables compared to the closed economy set-
ting and determines the asymmetric response of the domestic sectors to various shocks.
We characterized the optimal policy by the optimal targeting rule, which is a rather
complex expression.
Furthermore, we experimented with alternative simple rules and analyzed their
ability to replicate the optimal solution. The numerical results suggest that the type
of shock is an important determinant of the comparative performance of optimal ver-
sus simple policy rules. Specically, the optimal responses di¤er the most from the
simple rules under scal and mark-up shocks. On the contrary, the DIT regime better
approximates the optimal plan under foreign and productivity shocks.
An analysis of the welfare implications of alternative simple rules suggests that
strict targeting of domestic and CPI ination does not yield the best approximations
for the optimal policy, and social welfare can be improved by accounting for other
policy objectives, namely, the output gap and the relative prices. We presented a
ranking of alternative simple rules and evaluated the welfare benets of targeting the
core versus broader ination indices. In addition, we showed that the simple rules
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which incorporate a response to the relative price changes achieve more e¢ cient stabi-
lization of sector-specic variables. Finally, the sensitivity analysis demonstrates that
implications of equal degree of price stickiness across sectors di¤er for closed and open
economies. Unlike the policy implemented in the closed economy, the optimal strategy
in the open economy may prescribe the equivalent response to changes in sector-specic
price indices (and thus targeting the aggregate price index) even under the diverse val-
ues of sectoral nominal rigidities. Targeting the "core" rather than domestic ination
delivers higher welfare as prices in the non-traded sector become relatively stickier,
the economy is more open, and the elasticity of substitution between home and for-
eign goods increases. The DIT regime becomes welfare benecial as the possibility to
substitute between non-tradable and tradable goods rises.
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Appendix
The Steady State
We approximate the model around the steady state, in which AN = AH = 1; GH =
GN = 0, H  1, N  1. We assume that producer prices do not change in the steady
state, i.e., H =
PH;t
PH;t 1
= 1 and N =
PN;t
PN;t 1
= 1 at all times. The optimal risk-sharing
condition implies that ERt =
UC(C

t )
UC(Ct)
ko. Under the given functional forms, we obtain
the condition for the steady state: ER =

C
C


ko. By choosing ko =

C
C

 
we
obtain the steady state real exchange rate equal to unity, i.e., ER = 1. We normalize
the price indices of traded goods at home and abroad so that PH = P F , as usually
assumed in the literature, i.e., in the steady state the terms of trade PFH are equal to
unity. Moreover, from the price index equation (1a) it follows that PH = P T . We can
write the general price index (1) as: 1 = [p1 !N + (1   )p1 !T ]
1
1 ! where pN =
PN
P
,
pT =
PT
P
. From this relation we obtain PN = P T = P . The price index equations and
the fact that ER = 1 imply that in the steady state prices at home and abroad are
equalized. Furthermore, the price setting equations imply the following relationships
in the steady state:
UC(C)
PH
P
= HVy(Y H); (1)
UC(C)
PN
P
= NVy(Y N) : (2)
From the aggregate demand equations (7) and (4) (main text) we obtain:
Y H =
h
(1  )C + (1  )eCi ; (3)
Y N = C: (4)
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The world aggregate resource constraint is given by: Y + Y

= C + C

. Combining
this condition with (3) and (4) we obtain:
C
C
 =
(1  )e
(1  )(1  ) : (5)
This relation demonstrates that even under the complete market assumption, the struc-
tural asymmetries result in a wedge between consumption in the two countries. Finally,
ko =

C
C

 
=

(1 )e
(1 )(1 ) :
 
:
Second-Order Approximation of the Utility Function and Equi-
librium Conditions
We apply the methodology described in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford
(2005) in order to obtain the second-order approximation to the utility function of the
form:
U jt = Et
( 1X
s=t
s t[U(Cjs)  V (ys;T (j); Ais;T )  V (ys;N(j); Ais;N)]
)
: (6)
We assume that preferences have isoelastic functional form and we arrive at the fol-
lowing expression:
Wto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0 (7)266666664
bCt   (N) 1 bYN;t   (H) 1(1  )bYH;t + 12(1  ) bC2t
 1
2
(N)
 1(1 + )bY 2N;t   12(H) 1(1  )(1 + )bY 2H;t
+(N)
 1 bAN;tbYN;t + (H) 1(1  ) bAH;tbYH;t
 1
2
 
NkN
2N;t   12(1  ) HkH 
2
H;t:+ t:i:p+ (
3)
377777775
;
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where t:i:p: denotes terms that are independent of policy and (
3) denotes terms
that are of third order and higher. We can write (7) in a vector-matrix form as:
Wto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0

z
0
xxt  
1
2
x
0
tZxxt   x
0
tZt  
1
2
zH
2
H;t  
1
2
zN
2
N;t

+t:i:p+(
3);
(8)
where
x
0
t 
 bYH;t bYN;t bCt bPHT;t bPNT;t dERt  ;

0
t 
 bAH;t bAN;t bH;t bN;t bgH;t bgN;t bCt bP NT;t  ;
z
0
x 

( (H) 1(1  )) ( (N) 1) 1 0 0 0

;
Zx 
2666666666666664
(H)
 1(1  )(1 + ) 0 0 0 0 0
0 (N)
 1(1 + ) 0 0 0 0
0 0  (1  ) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
Z 
2666666666666664
 (H) 1(1  ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0  (N) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
:
zH  (1  )

HkH
zN  

NkN
;
where kL =
(1 L)(1 L)
L(1+)
, for L = H;N .
We now derive the second-order approximation to the structural equilibrium con-
ditions. Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), we approximate the optimal price-
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setting equation (expression (10) in the main text) for both domestic sectors as well
as the law of motion for the sectoral price indices (11). We combine the corresponding
expressions and, after integrating forward, obtain the following relations:
V H0 = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 (9)8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
h
bYH;t +  bCt   bPHT;t +  bPNT;t + bH;t    bAH;ti+ 12(1  !)(1  ) bP 2NT;t
+1
2
264 bYH;t +  bCt   bPHT;t+
 bPNT;t + bH;t    bAH;t
375
264 (2 + )bYH;t    bCt + bPHT;t 
 bPNT;t + bH;t    bAH;t
375
+1
2
(1+)
kH
2H;t + s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3)
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
;
V N0 = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 (10)8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
h
bYN;t +  bCt   (1  ) bPNT;t + bN;t    bAN;ti++12(1  !)(1  ) bP 2NT;t
+1
2
264 bYN;t +  bCt   (1  ) bPNT;t+bN;t    bAN;t
375
264 (2 + )bYN;t    bCt + (1  ) bPNT;t+
+bN;t    bAN;t
375
+1
2
(1+)
kN
2N;t + s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3)
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
;
where s:o:t:i:p: denotes second-order terms independent of policy. We can present
equations (9) and (10) in a vector-matrix form as :
V H0 = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0

a
0
xxt + a
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tAxxt + x
0
tAt +
1
2
aH
2
H;t

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3);
(11)
V N0 = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0

b
0
xxt + b
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tBxxt + x
0
tBt +
1
2
bN
2
N;t

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3);
(12)
where
a
0
x 

 0   1  0

;
a
0
 

  0 1 0 0 0 0 0

:
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Ax 
2666666666666664
(2 + ) 0   1  0
0 0 0 0 0 0
 0  2   0
 1 0   1  0
 0    2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
A 
2666666666666664
 (1 + ) 0 (1 + ) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
aH 
(1 + )
kH
:
b
0
x 

0   0  (1  ) 0

;
b
0
 

0   0 1 0 0 0 0

:
Bx 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 (2 + )  0   (1  ) 0
0   2 0 (1  ) 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0  (1  ) (1  ) 0 (1  )2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
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B 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0  (1 + ) 0 (1 + ) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
bN 
(1 + )
kN
:
The traded-goods demand equation is of the form:
YH =

PT
P
 ! 
PH
PT
 
 (13)(
(1  )C +

1
ER
 ! 
1
(PFH) 1 + (1  )
  !
1 
(1  )eC) :
We take the second-order expansion of (13) and obtain the following relation:
bYH;t =   [ + (   !)] bPHT;t + ! bPNT;t +  bCt + !(1  )dERt + (1  ) bCt +
+bgH;t + 1
2
(1  ) bC2t + 12!2(1  )dER2t + 12!(1  !)(1  )[PNT;2t  
 1
2

(1  )

(1  )(   !)  (   !)22 bP 2HT;t   (   !)!2dERt bPHT;t   (14)
 !(1  )dERt bCt + (   !)2 bCt bPHT;t + !(1  )dERt bCt   (   !)2 bPHT;t bCt  
 (1  ) bCt bCt   ! bPNT;tbgH;t + [ + (   !)] bPHT;tbgH;t    bCtbgH;t  
 !(1  )dERtbgH;t + s:o:t:i:p:+ (3):
In a vector-matrix form the expression above takes the following form:
1X
t=t0
t t0

c
0
xxt + c
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tCxxt + x
0
tCt

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3) = 0; (15)
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where
c
0
x 

 1 0    [ + (   !)] ! !(1  )

;
c
0
 

0 0 0 0 1 0 (1  ) 0

:
Cx 
2666666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 (1  ) (   !)2 0   !(1  )
0 0 (   !)2 
(1 )
264 (1  )(   !) 
(   !)22
375 0  (   !)!2
0 0 0 0 !(1  !)(1  ) 0
0 0  !(1  )  (   !)!2 0 !2(1  )
3777777777777777775
;
C 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0   0  (1  ) 0
0 0 0 0 [ + (   !)] 0  (   !)2 0
0 0 0 0  ! 0 0 0
0 0 0 0  !(1  ) 0 !(1  ) 0
3777777777777775
:
Similarly, the demand equation for non-traded goods takes the following form:
YN =

PN
P
 !
C: (16)
The second-order approximation of this equation yields the following expressions:
bYN;t = bCt   w(1  ) bPNT;t + bgN;t + 1
2
(1  )!(1  !) bP 2NT;t  (17)
bCtbgN;t + !(1  ) bPNT;tbgN;t + (3);
1X
t=t0
t t0

d
0
xxt + d
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tDxxt + x
0
tDt

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3) = 0: (18)
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d
0
x 

0  1 1 0   w(1  ) 0

;
d
0
 

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

;
Dx 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1  )!(1  !) 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
D 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0  1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 !(1  ) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
The second-order approximation of the risk-sharing equation (9) in the main text takes
the form: bCt = 1

dERt + bCt : (19)
1X
t=t0
t t0

e
0
xxt + e
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tExxt + x
0
tEt

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3) = 0: (20)
e
0
x 

0 0  1 0 0 1


;
e
0
 

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

:
Ex = 0; E = 0:
Finally, the real exchange rate equation (12) approximated up to the second order takes
61
the form:
 bPHT;t =  (1  )dERt   (1  ) bPNT;t + (1  ) bP NT;t   12 (1  ) (1  )dER2t   (21)
 1
2
(1  )

(1  )

+ (1  !)(1  )
 bP 2NT;t   (1  ) (1  )dERt bPNT;t +
+
(1  )

(1  )dERt bP NT;t + (1  ) (1  ) bPNT;t bP NT;t + s:o:t:i:p:+ (3):
1X
t=t0
t t0

f
0
xxt + f
0
t +
1
2
x
0
tFxxt + x
0
tFt

+ s:o:t:i:p:+ (
3) = 0: (22)
f
0
x 

0 0 0     (1  )   (1  )

;
f
0
 

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1  )

;
Fx 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0  (1  )
h
(1 )

+ (1  !)(1  )
i
  (1 )

(1  )
0 0 0 0  (1 )

(1  )   (1 )

(1  )
3777777777777775
;
F 
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 )

(1  )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 )

(1  )
3777777777777775
:
We combine constraints (11), (12), (15), (18), (20), and (22) in order to get rid of the
linear terms in the objective function (8). We collect vectors that contain the linear
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components of the above constraints and derive the vector , such that:

ax bx cx dx ex fx

  = zx:
We solve the system of linear equations using the symbolic Matlab toolbox and derive
values 1   6 associated with each of the constraints. After the linear terms cancel,
we obtain the following expression for the loss function:
Lto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0

1
2
x
0
t
eZxxt + x0t eZt + 12 eZH2H;t + 12 eZN2N;t

+K0+t:i:p+(
3);
(23)
where eZx = Zx + 1Ax + 2Bx + 3Cx + 4Dx + 5Ex + 6Fx;
eZ = Z + 1A + 2B + 3C + 4D + 5E + 6F;
eZH = zH + 1aH ;
eZN = zN + 2bN ;
K0  UCC

1V
H
0 + 2V
N
0

:
Vectors eZx; eZH ; eZN represent the weights next to the endogenous variables in the
objective function.
Furthermore, we would like to present the loss function (23) in terms of the variablesbYN;t, bYH;t, dERt, bPNT;t. Thus, we map the vector of all endogenous variables x0t  bYH;t bYN;t bCt bPHT;t bPNT;t dERt  into the variables of interest with the use
of matrices Q and Q such that:
xt = Q
 bYH;t bYN;t bPNT;t dERt 0 +Qt; (24)
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and
Q =
2666666666666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
(1  )   (1 )(el+1 )

 (1 )(l+1 )

0 0  (1 )

 (1 )

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
3777777777777775
;
Q =
2666666666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0  (1  )   0 (1 )(el+1 )

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(1 )

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777777777775
;
where l = (   1)(1   )(1 + ) and el = l   (!   1)(1   ): Therefore, the loss
function (23) can be expressed as follows:
Lto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0

1
2
X
0
tWxXt +X
0
tWt +
1
2
WH
2
H;t +
1
2
WN
2
N;t

+K0+t:i:p+(
3);
(25)
where X
0
t =
 bYH;t bYN;t bPNT;t dERt  ; Wx = Q0 eZxQ; W = Q0 eZxQ + Q0 eZ;
WH =
eZH ; WN = eZN :Finally, we present the variables in the objective function
in terms of the deviations from their target values. Thus, we denote the gap as eXt =
(Xt   XTt ). The target values are functions of the exogenous shocks and take the
following general form: XTt =

 W
Wx
t

: As a result, we are able to present the
objective function in the following quadratic form:
Lto = UCCEt0
1X
t=t0
t t0

1
2
(Xt  XTt )
0
Wx(Xt  XTt ) +
1
2
WH
2
H;t +
1
2
WN
2
N;t

+
+K0 + t:i:p+ (
3): (26)
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Expression (26) corresponds to formula (29) in the main text.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Calibration of the parameters
Parameters Denition Value
Structural parameters
 discount factor 0.99
 inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 3
 intermediate goods elasticity of substitution 6
 elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 1.5
! elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods 0.5
 inverse of elasticity of goods production 0.47
 share of non-tradables 0.5
 degree of openness 0.6
 share of non-tradables in foreign country 0.5
H Calvo price parameter, tradable sector 0.55
N Calvo price parameter, non-tradable sector 0.6
Parameters of stochastic shocks
Ah technology autoregressive coe¢ cient, tradable sector 0.8
Ah technology standard deviations, tradable sector 0.024
An technology autoregressive coe¢ cient, non-tradable sector 0.9
An technology standard deviations, non-tradable sector 0.008
Gh autoregressive coe¢ cient government spending shock, tradable sector 0.7
Gh standard deviations of government spending shock, tradable sector 0.01
Gn autoregressive coe¢ cient government spending shock, non-trad. sector 0.8
Gn standard deviations of government spending shock, non-trad. sector 0.008
h autoregressive coe¢ cient mark-up shock, tradable sector 0.7
h standard deviations of mark-up shock, tradable sector 0.02
n autoregressive coe¢ cient mark-up shock, non-tradable sector 0.8
n standard deviations of mark-up shock, non-tradable sector 0.014
C autoregressive coe¢ cient of foreign consumption shock 0.9
C standard deviations of foreign consumption shock 0.007
pnt autoregressive coe¢ cient of foreign relative price shock 0.7
pnt standard deviations of foreign relative price shock 0.012
Parameters of calibrated monetary policy rule
r smoothing coe¢ cient 0.75
  ination coe¢ cient 0.49
 Y output gap coe¢ cient 0.038
"r standard deviations of monetary policy shock 0.003
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Table 2. Matching the moments: Data and the baseline model
(Canadian data, HP-ltered series, sample 1981Q1-2007Q4)
Series, std. in % Data Model
Total output 1.45 1.33
Output, tradable sector 3.14 3.77
Output, non-tradable sector 1.22 1.47
CPI ination 0.47 0.48
Ination, tradable sector 0.73 0.73
Ination,non-tradable sector 0.44 0.40
Real exchange rate 3.48 3.60
Nominal interest rate 0.36 0.41
Denitions of used data series (data source - Statistics Canada):
- Real exchange rate: computed as nominal CDN$-US$ exchange rate deated by
Canadian and US CPI data.
- Nominal interest rate: Canadian 3-month T-bill interest rate.
- CPI ination rate: the percentage change in the consumer price index.
- CPI ination, tradable sector: the percentage change in the consumer price index
for goods.
- CPI ination, non-tradable sector: the percentage change in the consumer price
index for services.
- Total output: GDP at 1997 constant dollars, s.a.
- Output, tradable sector: commodities and manufactured goods 1997 constant
dollars, s.a.
- Output, non-tradable sector: services 1997 constant dollars, s.a.: utilities, con-
struction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information and
cultural industries, nance and insurance, real estate and renting and leasing and man-
agement of companies and enterprises, professional scientic and technical services,
administrative and support, waste management and remediation services, educational
services, health care and social assistance, arts entertainment and recreation, accom-
modation and food services, other services, public administration.
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Figure 1.11: Welfare losses under alternative policies in the open economy
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Figure 1.12: Welfare losses under alternative policies in the closed economy
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Figure 1.13: Welfare gains from targeting alternative ination indices: price stickiness
and openness
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Figure 1.14: Welfare gains from targeting alternative ination indices: elasticities of
substitution
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Chapter 2
Bayesian Estimation
of DSGE Models under Adaptive Learning:
Robustness Issues
Abstract:
We evaluate model t, estimated parameters, and perceived persistence of ination in several
DSGE models of Euro area estimated under adaptive learning and rational expectations
(RE). We systematically vary model size, information set available to the learning agents,
and the way of forming agentsinitial beliefs. We nd that assuming adaptive expectations
results in better model t than if RE is used, especially when the agents use very little
information to form their beliefs. Initial beliefs which are restricted to be consistent with the
estimated RE equilibrium are found to be rather robust, as varying them signicantly results
in an essentially identical estimation. Pre-sample regression based initial beliefs, while more
consistent with the in-sample data on average than REE-consistent initial beliefs, su¤er from
signicant volatility and result in worse model t. Estimated parameters and the model t
depend signicantly on the information set used by the agents, which might explain widely
divergent result of previous estimations under AL.
JEL classication: C11, D84, E30, E52
Keywords: DSGE models, estimation, adaptive learning
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2.1 Introduction
The recent ability to implement advanced econometric techniques for systematic policy
analysis has encouraged a large literature on building and estimating DSGE models.
Matching empirically observed features of the data, for example persistence and hump-
shaped Impulse Response Functions (IRF) of key macroeconomic variables such as in-
ation, output, employment, etc., necessitates inclusion of a variety of rigidities into a
standard micro-founded New-Keynesian framework model. These rigidities, both real
(habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utiliza-
tion, xed costs) and nominal (Calvo prices and wages, partial indexation of prices and
wages to past ination), enable models to capture the dynamic properties of observed
data, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007). For example, the inclusion of mechanicalendogenous persistence mechanisms,
such as habit formation and price indexation, can inuence the consumption and ina-
tion dynamics and considerably change the overall performance of the model. For that
reason, the empirical literature attempts to assess the validity of alternative modelling
assumptions and evaluate the ability of various DSGE models to t macroeconomic
data. This issue gains further relevance when considering the growing interest in the
application of micro-founded DSGE models to policy making in central banks. In par-
ticular, misspecication of the models microfoundations may a¤ect the welfare criteria
and result in an inaccurate ranking of alternative policy regimes.
Some of the rigidities that were used in DSGE models recently, for example partial
ination indexation, have been criticized as being ad-hoc and having no theoretical
foundation, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009). Bayesian estimation of the
models requires the number of stochastic shocks driving the model to be at least equal
to the number of observed variables, but certain shocks included into these models were
criticized as lacking structural interpretation; assuming that such shocks are highly
persistent could be questioned as well.
Even rigidities-augmented DSGE models which are driven by many shocks could
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remain misspecied, as evidenced, for example, by recent DSGE-VAR analysis of Del
Negro and Schorfheide (2006). One hypothesis regarding the source of the residual
misspecication has been the fact that the agentsexpectations are rational, meaning
that their subjective expectations of forward-looking variables are always consistent
with the model and coincide with true mathematical expectations for given parameter
values and assumed stochastic structure of the exogenous processes (shocks). Testing
this hypothesis has been a major motivation behind a recent literature on estimating
New Keynesian DSGE models under assumption that the agents, instead of having
Rational Expectations (RE), behave as econometricians and constantly reestimate
the relation between forwardlooking and other variables of the model, trying to learn
the true functional form of the expectation formation mechanism.
An additional source of support for the less-than-rational beliefs hypothesis can
be found in estimates of New Keynesian Phillips curves under assumption of sticky
information for price settlers. As Reis (2009) summarizes, often the major source of
the lack of t for these models is an assumption that the agents are making decisions
based on expectations that are rational even when based on incomplete information.
Gomes (2010) attempts to develop a sticky information model where the agents who
cannot act on the latest information use adaptive learning (AL) of the form described by
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) to form expectations, instead of expectations constructed
rationally on basis of outdated information.
In adaptive learning literature, the agents are assumed to possess imperfect knowl-
edge about the reduced form parameters of the model when forming expectations about
the future. Agents forecast future values of the lead variables with a linear function
of state and exogenous variables. Agentsbeliefs about the dynamics of forward look-
ing variables are updated using the constant-gain Recursive Least Square algorithm.
Learning represents an alternative source of endogenous inertia; in addition, it a¤ects
the transmission mechanism of the model and makes it time-varying through variation
in agentsbeliefs.
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In the sticky prices DSGE literature, several recent studies made e¤orts to improve
the model t as well as to address the issue of possible model misspecication by de-
parting from the RE hypothesis and incorporating adaptive learning as an expectation
formation mechanism. These studies have documented dramatically di¤erent conclu-
sions when comparing the t and estimated parameters (especially structural rigidities)
of the models under rational expectations and with learning. The strongest result in
favor of integrating the assumption of bounded rationality into the DSGE models was
presented by Milani (2007), who considers a very simple three equation New Keynesian
model with ination indexation, Calvo prices, and habit formation, estimated under
assumption that the agents are adaptive learners using constant gain Recursive Least
Squares (RLS) learning, and compares the results with estimates under RE. The mod-
els are estimated using Bayesian methods. Judged by marginal data density, the model
with adaptive learning ts the US data signicantly better than the RE model. Under
adaptive learning certain structural rigidity parameters reduce signicantly, conclusion
being that the persistence observed in macroeconomic variables such as ination might
be endogenous and caused by agentslearning. Similar results are reported by Milani
(2008).
Murray (2007) estimates a simple New Keynesian model augmented with rm-
specic capital and constant gain RLS learning using maximum likelihood method
rather than Bayesian estimation. He pays a special attention to selecting initial beliefs
that the learning agents hold before the estimation period. Adaptive learning models
do not t the US data better than RE models, and Milani results on unimportance of
structural rigidities in presence of adaptive learning are not conrmed. On the contrary,
some structural rigidities such as capital adjustment costs become signicantly more
important under learning.
Vilagi (2007) considers several models, one of them very similar to that studied
by Milani (2007). He estimates the models using Bayesian methods and the euro-
area data. He concludes that model estimated under adaptive learning ts the data
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signicantly better than the RE model, especially if the agents are assumed to form
their expectations using only simple univariate AR(1) processes in observed variables.
Some structural rigidities become less pronounced under adaptive learning, but in
general Vilagi does not conrm results of Milani (2007, 2008). It is unclear whether
the di¤erences are caused by the data (US vs. EU) used for the estimation.
Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) estimate the medium size model of Smets and
Wouters (2007) under adaptive learning, where the agents are using constant gain
RLS. They pay particular attention to the question of forming initial beliefs of the
agents, and to the information set available to the agents forecasting future values of
the forward-looking variables. Several of the models with learning t the data equally
well or even better than the RE model. Specic initial beliefs contribute signicantly
to this result: best performing models are the ones where the initial beliefs are opti-
mized to explain the in-sample data, consistent with previous results. Limiting the set
of variables used in the forecasting equations can generate models with improved data
t. Learning models are able to generate a rapid and short lived ination response to
productivity shocks, while the response to monetary shocks is slow but very persistent.
These results overcome some of the major shortcomings of the model under RE. Having
forecasting equations that di¤er signicantly from those implied by the REE is the key
to this result. The additional dynamics that are introduced by the learning process
do not systematically alter the estimated structural parameters of the DSGE model,
contradicting claims in Milani (2007, 2008).
Slobodyan and Wouters (2010) study what happens if agentsforecasts are based
on very small forecasting models, in particular on a model where expected value of a
forward-looking variable depends on a constant and two lags of the variable. This fore-
casting model is similar to the best method of forecasting in Vilagi (2007). In contrast
to other AL papers reviewed, the agents estimate simple forecasting models by Kalman
lter. The results indicate that a model in which agents use a simple forecasting model
to form expectations does t the data better than the RE model. Relative to the
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DSGE model under rational expectations, models with learning are estimated to have
lower persistence of the exogenous shocks, especially of price and wage markup shocks;
structural rigidity parameters decrease insignicantly. The results are robust to the
sample period and precise specication of the forecasting model and initial beliefs.
Finally, Jaaskela and McKibbin (2010) estimate a small open economy DSGEmodel
for Australia under constant gain RLS learning. They nd that mechanicalsources
of persistence do not become unimportant under AL, and that the data marginally
prefer the model with adaptive learning to the RE model.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on estimation of DSGE models under
adaptive learning. We evaluate empirically the relative importance of several types of
frictions (mechanical rigidities) versus learning. Our major contribution is that
we provide the answer to these questions by o¤ering a comprehensive analysis of the
factors which could determine a diversity of the estimation results under adaptive
learning. In such a way we wish to reconcile contradictory conclusions from the previous
studies. We perform Bayesian estimation and compare (in terms of the model t and
structural parameters) DSGE models under RE and di¤erent AL schemes and study
the robustness of the estimation results in several dimensions: by modifying the model
size, way of generating initial beliefs, and the set of variables included into the agents
forecasting models. All models are estimated on Euro Area data set described in
Fagan et al. (2001) over the period 1970:Q12007:Q4 using from 3 to 7 observable
macro variables. Previously, only Vilagi (2007) used this data in Bayesian estimation
of a DSGE model under adaptive learning. By treating the models in a unied way,
we attempt to shed some light on the general outcomes that could be expected from
other DSGE model with adaptively formed expectations, and discuss possible sources
of discrepant results observed so far in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the models
used. Adaptive learning set-up, ways of forming initial beliefs, and selection of infor-
mation sets are taken up in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the estimation results,
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and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Models
We estimate and study the e¤ects of AL on the three types of models, denoted in the
rest of the paper M1M3.
M1 is a simple 3 equation New Keynesian (NK) model with Calvo prices, price
indexation, and habit formation in consumption. This is a model similar to that
studied by Milani (2007, 2008), Vilagis Model C, and one of the models in Murray
(2007). The log-linearized version of the model consists of 3 equations.
The rst equation of the model is aggregate demand equation, derived from the
optimization problem of households:
yt =
hyt 1 + Et [yt+1]  1 h (rt   Et[t+1])
1 + h
+ ebt ; (1)
where yt is real GDP, t the ination rate, and rt the nominal interest rate. The para-
meter h represents external habit formation, giving raise to the presence of backward-
looking component in the Euler equation.  is the measure of the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. The exogenous disturbance ebt is the measure of the preference
shock, and follows the rst-order autoregressive process,
ebt = be
b
t 1 + 
b
t :
The presence of nominal rigidities (Calvo pricing and indexation to lagged ination)
imply the following Phillips curve relation:
t =
1
1 + p

8><>: Et[t+1] + pt 1 +

(1 p)(1 p)
p

h

1  +

(1 h) +

1 

yt   h1 hyt 1
i
9>=>;+ pt ; (2)
where p is the degree of ination indexation, p the Calvo parameter, the labor disu-
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tility parameter1, and  is the capital share parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production
function. The innovation pt  N(0; p) is an i.i.d. process.
Finally, the policy of the central bank in setting the nominal interest rate is de-
scribed by the following rule:
rt = wrt 1 + (1  w)(&t + &yyt) + rt ; (3)
where rt  N(0; p) is the i.i.d. shock.
M2 is a model M1 augmented with sticky wages, wage indexation, and sticky em-
ployment (similar to Vilagis Model A). Our model di¤ers from Vilagis by introducing
a shock to the labor supply elt, which enables better capturing of the properties of
the wage ination process. Derivations of the models log-linearized equations can be
found in Vilagi (2007). The model consists of the following equations:
The aggregate demand equation is the same as in the model M1 and is given by
(1).
The price ination equation is now given as
t =
1
1 + p


Et[t+1] + pt 1 +

(1  p)(1  p)
p

(wrt + lt   eat )

+ pt ;
(4)
where wrt is real wage rate and eat the rst order autoregressive productivity shock,
eat = ae
a
t 1 + 
a
t :
The wage ination equation is given by:
wrt =
1
1 + 
 (Et[wrt+1] + wrt 1 + Et[t+1]  (1 + w)t + wt 1) + (5)
1The utility fucntion takes the form:
Ut = e
b
t

(Ct  Ht)1 
1     e
l
t
(lt)
1+
1 + 

;
where Ht = hCt 1 is external habit.
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+
(1  w)(1  w)
(1 + )w(1 + w)


(1  h)(yt   hyt 1) + lt   wrt + e
l
t

+ wt ;
where lt are labor hours, w and w are Calvo wage and wage indexation parameters,
and w is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent types of labor. elt is a labor
supply shock which follows rst order autoregressive process:
elt = le
l
t 1 + 
l
t:
The innovation wt  N(0; w) is and i.i.d. process.
The log-linearized rms technology process takes the form
yt = (1  )lt + eat : (6)
Policy rule of the central bank is described by equation (3).
Finally, following Vilagi (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2003), sticky employment
is modeled as follows:
emt   emt 1 =  (Et[emt+1]  emt) + (1  l)(1  l)
l
(lt   emt) + mt ; (7)
where emt denotes the number of people employed, l is the Calvo-type employment
parameter, and mt  N(0; m) is an i.i.d. shock. The inclusion of such an auxiliary
equation for employment is motivated by the absence of the consistent euro area data
on aggregate labor hours, whereas the employment variable is available. Since the
response of employment to macroeconomic shocks is rather persistent, it is assumed
that only a constant fraction l of rms can adjust employment to its desired total
labor input.
The model M3 is a Smets and Wouters (2003) model. In addition to the frictions
included into M2, this model has investment adjustment costs and variable capital
utilization. Detailed description of the model can be found in the original paper.
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To summarize, the model M1 has 3 endogenous variables (yt; t; rt); 3 exogenous
shocks (pt ; 
r
t ; e
b
t), and 3 observables (yt; t; rt): The model M2 is described by 6 model
variables (yt; t; rt; wrt; lt;emt), 7 shocks (
p
t ; 
w
t ; 
m
t ; 
r
t ; e
l
t; e
b
t ; e
a
t ); and 5 observables
(yt; t; rt; wrt; emt): M3 contains 11 variables, the M2 set plus real consumption, real
investment, capital stock, its rental rate, and price of capital (ct;invt;kt; rkt; qt), and
10 exogenous shocks, the M2 set plus investment shock, shock to government spend-
ing and the asset price shock (einvt ; e
G
t ; e
Q
t ): Model M3 is estimated using 7 observable
variables (yt; ct; invt;t; rt; wrt; emt).
2.3 Variations of adaptive learning
2.3.1 Constant Gain RLS
We implement the adaptive learning within the DYNARE 3.064 MATLAB toolbox
which is used to estimate and simulate DSGE models.2 The models are driven by the
exogenous stochastic processes wt which are either iid random variables or univariate
AR(1) processes:
wt =  wt 1 +t: (8)
Up to the rst order of approximation, DYNARE represents our models in the following
way:
A0
264yt 1
wt 1
375+ A1
264yt
wt
375+ A2Etyt+1 +B0t = const; (9)
where the vector yt includes endogenous variables of the model. This representation is
exact in our case because we work we log-linearized models. Under RE, the DYNARE
solution is 264yt
wt
375 = + T
264yt 1
wt 1
375+Rt: (10)
2This is the same toolbox that was used in Slobodyan and Wouters (2009, 2010).
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Deviating from the RE assumption and following Marcet and Sargent (1989) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we assume that the agents forecast future values of
the forward-looking variables using a linear function of endogenous variables and ex-
ogenous driving processes,
yft = 
T
t 1Zt 1; (11)
where the exact set of variables included into Z depends on the information set which
the agents are assumed to use in forming their forecast. For more details on information
sets, see below.3 The agentsbeliefs about reduced form coe¢ cients  are updated
using a constant-gain variant of the Recursive Least Squares (RLS). The constant gain
algorithm is one of many adaptive methods that allow operating in a non-stationary
environment. Besides an advantage of being widely studied in the adaptive learning
literature, this method has a natural interpretation as Weighted Least Squares where
the weight of a data point depends geometrically on its vintage, with the most recent
point getting the highest weight. The agents thus forgetinformation from the distant
past which might be desirable if the environment, and in particular the dependence of
forward-looking variables on elements of Z, is perceived to be time-varying.
Every period, the agents are updating their beliefs in a constant gain RLS step:
t = t 1 + gR
 1
t Zt 1(y
f
t   Tt 1Zt 1)T ; (12a)
Rt = Rt 1 + g(Zt 1ZTt 1  Rt 1): (12b)
All endogenous model variables have zero means. Therefore, the beliefs should not
include a constant. In some specications of the learning we do not include the constant
to be consistent with the theoretical solution. However, if we assume that the agents
are also (implicitly) learning the values of the growth rates or ination target, we
include the constant into (12).
Given current beliefs, it is possible to derive the value of Ety
f
t+1 as a function of
3In the adaptive learning literature, this equation is called the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM).
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a constant, yt; and wt: One can then solve equation (9) for
 
yTt ; w
T
t
T
and derive a
timevarying VAR representation of the model:
264yt
wt
375 = t + Tt
264yt 1
wt 1
375+Rtt: (13)
The values of t; Tt; and Rt are then used to form expectations of the next period
model variables in the Kalman lter. Thus, the estimation of a DSGE model under
adaptive learning reduces to calculating a timevarying law of motion for the model
and plugging it into the Kalman lter step, leaving the rest of the DYNARE toolbox
largely untouched.
This procedure makes Tt a complicated function of the data, current parameters,
and beliefs which could easily become unstable for one or several periods. As in common
in the learning literature, we use a projection facility that skips an updating in such
cases (see for instance Evans and Honkapohja 2001).4
2.3.2 Initial Beliefs
Equations (12) allow us to track the agents beliefs over time, if both the data and the
initial beliefs are known. Following Slobodyan and Wouters (2009), we use three ways
of selecting initial beliefs. In the rst two ways, initial beliefs are consistent with some
REE, while the third is based on regression estimates of the presample data.
The rst two ways of selecting the initial beliefs use equation (14) below to calculate
0 and R0. At any REE, given for example by (10), one could derive a matrix of
second moments of the model variables, 
. These moments imply a relation between
the forward-looking variables yf and the variables used in forecasting Z, yft = 
T
0Zt 1;
given by a projection of yft onto Zt 1. Initial condition for the second moments matrix
R used in equations (12) is taken directly from the corresponding rows and columns of
4Standard projection facility is invoked when beliefs become unstable. Given that not all informa-
tion sets lead to beliefs that could be described by some VAR, we have to resort to imposing projection
facility when the transition matrix Tt loses stability.
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. The formulae for 0 and R0 are given by
0 = E

Zt 1ZTt 1
 1  E Zt 1 yft T ; (14a)
R0 = E

Zt 1ZTt 1

; (14b)
where the expectations E[] are derived using 
.
Denote the parameter vector that is used to derive the model equations : Denotee a vector of parameters for auxiliary model which generates matrix 
e that is
then used for calculations in (14). Then, in the rst way of deriving initial beliefs,
denoted W1,  = e at all times. In other words, initial beliefs are consistent with the
REE produced by the estimated parameter vector . W1 is the closest to the pure
rational expectations as only in-sample data variations could break the mapping of
REE-implied relations between forward-looking variables yft and predictors Zt 1 into
the agentsperceptions of these relations; in the beginning of the sample, the two are
the same. The way W1 is equivalent to the Case 2 in Murray (2007).
In the second way, W2, e is xed while  changes in the posterior optimization or
MCMC steps. In principle, e could be selected to be any parameter vector. In this
paper, we take several (usually 10 to 20) draws of e from the posterior distribution
of parameters, approximated by the multivariate normal distribution, obtained after
posterior maximization step under adaptive learning with W1 beliefs. W2 allows for
more exibility than W1, as the initial beliefs could now vary independently from the
model itself. On the other hand, thus constructed sets of initial beliefs are consistent
with RE equilibria that are rather similar to each other, because the parameter drawse are drawn from the same distribution; therefore, we consider W2 beliefs as a rela-
tively minor disturbance that allows us to check the sensitivity of estimation results to
the initial beliefs. In order to take the results of estimation under adaptive learning
seriously, the estimation should pass some minimum set of requirements, such as being
robust to W2 beliefs. The way W2 is close to, but not equivalent, to the Case 3 of
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Murray (2007).
Our third initialization approach, W3, uses regression-based initial beliefs, obtained
by running a regression of yft on Zt 1 using pre-sample data. We pick the point estimate
rather than a random point from the distribution of regression estimates, the latter
being proposed by Giannitsarou and Carceles-Poveda (2007). This way represents
a more serious robustness check for AL estimation that W2 for two reasons. First,
correlation structure of the variables could change signicantly between pre- and in-
sample data, in which case pre-sample regression-based initial beliefs are of not much
help to the agents in navigating in-sample environment. Second, the model could be
so misspecied that even W1 beliefs consistent with REE of the pre-sample estimated
model are still very far from those which could have been obtained by any regression.
In both cases, our W3 beliefs are likely to be signicantly di¤erent from the W1 ones,
thus allowing us to observe the e¤ect of initial beliefs on the estimation results.
2.3.3 Information Sets
Most of the theoretical results in the AL literature have been obtained for the case
of Minimum State Variable (MSV) learning, where the agents form their expectations
using a linear function of endogenous variables and stochastic shocks that is equivalent
to the function one would derive as the REE solution of the model. In particular,
the set of variables that is assumed to be available to the agents coincides with the
variables that determine rational expectations of forward-looking variables. Thus, in
MSV learning only the coe¢ cients of the expectation-forming function could di¤er from
their REE counterparts. MSV learning is one of the information sets that we use in
this paper, denoted by I1. As is standard in the learning literature, we assume that
the agents know exactly the law of motion (8) of the exogenous driving processes.
Assuming that the agents have access to the values of exogenous shocks is theoreti-
cally appealing as it enables convergence to the REE as an outcome of certain learning
algorithms, namely, RLS with decreasing gain (a recursive analog of standard OLS
94
regression) when the REE is E-stable, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for details.
However, this assumption could be criticized as unrealistic. Therefore, we employ a sec-
ond information set, I2, which assumes that the agents use the same endogenous model
variables as the ones present in the REE solution, but not the exogenous stochastic
processes.
Several papers in the small but growing literature on estimation of DSGE models
under AL used an extreme informational assumption, making forecasts of macroeco-
nomic variables depend only on own lag(s) of the variable itself and possibly a constant.
Thus, the forecasting equations become a set of univariate AR(1) or AR(2) processes.
Despite the fact that this approach denies the agents access to a signicant amount of
information available in the model, it was shown to lead to a very good model t, see
Vilagi (2007) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2010), among others. For this reason, we
include an information set assumption I3 into our study, where all the forward-looking
variables are believed by the agents to be simple univariate AR(1) processes.
In contrast to lowdimensional models studied by Milani (2007), Sargent, Williams,
and Zha (2006), or Vilagi (2007), combination of some of the information sets and
some models leads to necessity of accessing values of endogenous variables that are
not observed. In such cases we use output from the Kalman lter used to construct
the likelihood function for a particular combination of parameters on both sides of the
updating equation (12).5
2.4 Estimation Results
2.4.1 Data and Priors
For our estimations, we use the data set constructed in Fagan et al (2001) over the pe-
riod 1970:Q12007:Q4. The set of observables (varies from 3 to 7 variables depending
5We use only ltered estimates of endogenous variables, both of right- and left-hand sides of the
forecasting equations.
95
on the model) includes the key macro-economic variables of the euro area. When con-
structing the observables, the following time series were used: real GDP (YER), GDP
deator (YED), compensation to employees (WIN), number of employees (LNN), short-
term nominal interest rate (STN), real consumption expenditures (PCR), real invest-
ment (ITR). The time series of real wages is constructed as WR=(WIN/LNN)/YED.
The STN time series was divided by 4 to obtain quarterly data. The natural log-
arithms of all variables except the STN were taken. The ination rate is given by
ln(Y EDt)  ln(Y EDt 1): Real variables are linearly detrended using a separate trend
for each variable, estimated by OLS; ination and the nominal interest rate are de-
trended by the same linear trend in ination as in Smets and Wouters (2003).
We estimate all the models using Bayesian methods. The table of priors is pre-
sented in the Appendix A. We mostly followed the priors chosen in the original papers:
Smets and Wouters (2003) for M3 and Vilagi (2007) for M1. For the model M2 are
undertook a combined approach: prior distributions for shocks and some of the struc-
tural parameters (like habit and Calvo prices) are based on Smets and Wouters (2003),
at the same time we wanted to keep priors on some of the nominal rigidities (which
have most controversial empirical support , like price and wage indexation) as loose as
possible. In this approach, we followed Vilagi who assumed uniform prior distributions
for indexation. For the same reasons, we chose uniform prior on investment adjustment
cost in modelM3, and thus departed slightly from Smets and Wouters (2003). Overall,
since the major task of this paper was to investigate the impact of AL on structural
parameters, in particular nominal and real rigidities, we tried to avoid restricting such
parameters by strict priors, providing instead for maximum exibility while attempt-
ing to obtain unimodal posterior distributions under both RE and AL. Some of the
rigidities such as habit formation appeared to be rather robust to the change of priors.
A number of parameters were calibrated. Similarly to Smets andWouters (2003), we
x discount factor  at 0:99; capital share  = 0:30; the depreciation rate  = 0:025; the
share of steady state consumption in total output and the steady state investment share
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are assumed to be equal to 0.6 and 0.22 respectively. The labor disutility parameter 
is assumed to be xed in model M1 and equals 2:5.
Typically, 200,000 to 500,000 MCMC draws were performed, using two (in some
cases three) MCMC chains. For more details on Bayesian estimation of DGSE models,
see An and Schorfheide (2007).
2.4.2 Model Fit
The model t of a model estimated using Bayesian methods can be ascertained using
marginal data density, dened as
p (Y jM) =
Z
L (jY ) p()d;
where L (jY ) is the likelihood function of the data Y given parameters of the model ;
and p() is the prior density. This measure allows a straightforward comparison of two
models, sayM1 andM2 that are estimated on the same data. Posterior odds ratio, a
measure of how much more likely a modelM1 is when compared to the modelM2, is
given by
 (M1)
 (M2) 
p (Y jM1)
p (Y jM2) ;
where  (Mi) represents prior probability of a modelMi. The rst term in the above
expression is known as prior odds, and the second as Bayes factor. Usually, the prior
probabilities are taken to be equal, and thus a posterior odds ratio equals the cor-
responding Bayes factor. For more details on model comparison, consult An and
Schorfheide (2007).
Logarithms of marginal data densities from the estimations of our models are pre-
sented in the Table 2.1. Initial beliefs are constructed using the RE-consistent method
of way W1. Out major result is that the RE hypothesis is indeed restrictive. Relax-
ing the rationality assumption through introduction of adaptive learning improves the
marginal data density of the model for essentially all learning specications: the only
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case where RE and AL models have similar t is model M2, information set I1 (MSV
learning) with a constant. In all other cases the AL model t is signicantly better that
its counterpart under rational expectations. It is hard to compare the Bayes factors
across models that have di¤erent number of observable variables  three in M1, ve
in M2, and seven in M3. If the hypothesis of the rational expectations as the main
source of misspecication of a DSGE model is correct, then the adaptive learning could
correct some of it. One could presume that the resulting improvement in marginal data
density of the model under AL relative to the RE model then reects the degree of
mis-specication which could be di¤erent in models M1M3. Testing this conjecture is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
Table 2.1: Model Comparison in Terms of MArginal Likelihood
Model specication M1 M2 M3
REE -134.96 -182.83 -468.83
AL without constant:
I3: univariate AR(1) -125.61 -137.66 -421.65
I2: endogenous states -130.39 -147.71 -436.76
I1: endogenous states and shocks -129.36 -174.27 -449.11
AL with constant:
I3: univariate AR(1) -119.36 -129.2 -419.6
I2: endogenous states -131.45 -153.22 -442.19
I1: endogenous states and shocks -123.5 -182.7 -461.68
Log marginal data densities for the three models using di¤erent information set
assumptions and REE-consistent initial beliefs W1. Bayes factor  a relative
probability of one model over another, equals exp of the di¤erence between the
corresponding log densities.
Another result is that the most restrictive information set I3 is indeed the best
for all three models. This result has been observed previously by Vilagi (2007). Slo-
bodyan and Wouters (2010) also suggest that endowing the agents with a minimal set
of variables used in forecasting may work well in practice. The evidence on the other
two information sets is more mixed: I1, the largest set which is consistent with the
rational expectations MSV solution, is marginally better than the restricted MSV set
I2 for the smallest model M1 but is signicantly worse in the larger models M2 and
M3. Overall, though, we can observe a clear ranking I3I2I1, making a very strong
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case for the statement that the more restrictive is the information set available to the
agents for forecasting forward-looking variables, the better is the model t.
Comparing the AL estimations with and without the constant, we observe a clear
separation between the best set of variables I3 and the worse group of I2 and I1.
For the very economical forecasting equations implied by assuming I3 (just own lag
in every forecasting equation), including the constant improves the models marginal
data density signicantly, especially for the smaller models M1 and M2. For sets I1
and I2, including the constant worsens the marginal data density, sometimes by so
much that the overall model t is essentially the same as under the RE (information
set I1 with constant, model M2 ). The only exception to this rule is model M1, set I1.
We believe that large sets of regressors I1 and I2, when used in forecasting equations
on the real data over the estimation period, might lead to overtting. In this case,
adding an extra variable  a constant  makes the overtting problem worse. In
the model M1, the overtting problem is not as severe because the total number of
right-hand side variables is small (three endogenous variables and one shock). Notice
that for the intermediate information set I2, worsening of the t after including the
constant is minimal in model M1 and moderate in model M2, which is consistent with
the overtting of the forecasting equations explanation.
Finally, we analyze the relative t of alternative model specications as a function
of time. Specically, we would like to nd out whether the gain in the model t
observed under the information set I3 comes from a specic (short-lasted) time period,
or whether the superior performance of the model based on univariate forecasting rule
holds for the longer time span. Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative likelihood for model
specications I2 (dashed line) and I3 (dotted line) relative to I1. If a line is trending
up in this graph on some time interval, this means that on average the likelihood on
this interval is better relative to the I1 model. Figure 2.1 indicates that I3 model
does better than I1 almost all the time, except for 1985-1988 and 1990-1993. Before
1980 and after 1993 we observe a persistent positive trend in the I3 relative cumulative
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likelihood. This means that for most of the sample the model with I3 set is more
appropriate for describing the data generating process than the specication implied
by the information set I1; the better model t is broadly based rather than being due
to a particularly favorable performance at a specic time. On another hand, the gain
in the model t under I2 relative to I1 is relatively modest, especially in the second half
of the sample. In the rst half of 1970es the model with I2 information set performs
worse than the one with the full set of variables and shocks I1.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative likelihood for estimated model specications I2 and I3 relative
to I1.
2.4.3 Estimated Parameters
Given a large number of treatments in the paper, we compare the e¤ect of AL assump-
tion for the estimates of structural rigidity parameters and persistence of exogenous
shocks only for the best information set identied in the previous section, namely I3
with a constant. We will treat this specication as a baseline and consider the outcomes
with other sets of variables as a form of sensitivity analysis.
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the main results of our estimation. As is obvious
from the Table, under AL some estimated structural rigidities and persistence of the
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shocks fall, sometimes signicantly. Among the parameters present in all three models,
habit persistence parameter h presents the clearest picture: its estimate is lower under
AL than under RE. The drop is quite signicant: in M1 and M2, posterior mean
under adaptive learning lies outside of the 95% Highest Probability Density (HPD)
interval of RE estimation, for M3 it is less expressed because the HPD under RE is
very wide. Estimated Calvo pricing and ination indexation parameters fall in M1
but stay unchanged or even increase marginally in larger models M2 and M3. Among
parameters present in M2 and M3 only, Calvo wages parameter falls marginally, wage
indexation remains at essentially zero level as under RE, and Calvo parameter for
employment falls. Finally, the largest (M3 ) model-specic parameters  elasticities
of investment adjustment costs and of capital utilization  both fall, with adjustment
costs exhibiting the most dramatic decline among all the parameters studied (from 9.44
under RE to 3.21 under AL).
These results taken in the whole signal that there is indeed an overall drop in
structural rigidity parameters when the RE assumption is replaced by the AL one.
The parameters that are estimated to be somewhat extreme under the RE fall the
most (habit persistence in consumption h; investment adjustment costs '; Calvo prices
p, Calvo employment e), with Calvo wage parameter w being somewhat exceptional.
An increase in importance of mechanicalsources of rigidities is very seldom observed
 basically, only price indexation parameter in the model M2 inches up marginally
under AL from a very low level of 0.20 estimated under RE.
We also observe that the overall decrease in importance of mechanicalfrictions is
most pronounced in a small model M1 where there are few rigidities. This outcome is
consistent with the view that adaptive learning to a signicant degree serves as a tool
of remedying misspecications. For example, both Calvo pricing and price indexation
are estimated to be extremely high under the RE in model M1 (p = 0:97; p =
0:71). These parameters drop signicantly under the AL. Larger model M2 adds wage
rigidities which probably relax the misspecication present in M1. As a result, there is
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not much movement in this group of parameters (Calvo prices and wages, indexation
of prices and wages) between RE and AL estimations in M2. This result indicates
that the ability of adaptive learning to substitute for real and nominal rigidities can
be overestimated if one uses very small model. Therefore, Milanis conclusions who
obtained his results in the estimated three equation NK model cannot be expected to
apply in more complicated models to the same extent.6 We conclude that learning can
substitute for mechanical source of rigidities only partially; some of the structural
frictions remain quite strong.
Turning attention to the persistence of exogenous processes, we see that there is
no clear pattern: productivity shock can become less persistent while employment
equation shock persistence goes up. Demand shock becomes less persistent and become
more precisely estimated inM1 andM3 but remains well within Rational Expectations
HDP for this parameter that is very wide in both cases.
Comparing out results to others in the literature, we do not observe signicant
decline of consumption habits and price indexation parameters to zero in as in Milani
(2007) in a simple model M1, while in more complex models M2 and M3 price index-
ation is low already under the RE. Murray (2007), comparing Cases 1 and 3 (Case 3
is similar to the information set I2, not presented in the Table 2.2), observes an essen-
tially unchanged habit formation parameter (0.11 under RE to 0.12), and a dramatic
increase in capital adjustment friction, a parameter playing a role that is similar to our
'; which is found to drop signicantly under the AL in M3, the only model where this
friction is present. Murray also nds a signicant decrease in price indexation from
0.36 to 0.0, which is somewhat consistent with our estimates. J½a½askel½a and McKibbin
(2010) estimate an open economy model of Australia with initial beliefs constructed
by a method rather close to our W1 and nd that both habit persistence and share
6We have to note that similarly to Murray (2007) and Vilagi (2007), we do not conrm Milani
results who found some of the structural rigidity parameters to become insignicant undel learning.
Whether this discrepancy is due to the estimation method used (Murray (2007) used Maximum
Likelihood estimation) or the data (European in Vilagi (2007) and here vs. US in Milani 2007, 2008)
is a subject of further study.
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of rule-of-thumb consumers (this parameter plays a role somewhat akin to the price
indexation parameter) increase under AL. Slobodyan and Wouters (2008, 2009) report
that in a large model (very similar toM3 ) investment adjustment cost elasticity ' typ-
ically drops signicantly while habit persistence can grow (in Slobodyan and Wouters
2009; note, however, that they report habits increase from 0.70 under RE to 0.740.79
under AL, while here habits drop to 0.73, i.e., to approximately the same value) or
decrease slightly (in Slobodyan and Wouters 2008; from 0.77 to 0.68). Finally, Vilagi
(2007) nds that habit persistence could either decrease from 0.99 to 0.79 (in a small
model equivalent to M1 ) or stay unchanged at 0.99 in a model similar to M2. Price
indexation drops signicantly in both a small model similar to M1 (from 0.63 to 0.15)
and a largerM2 -like model (from 0.44 to 0.29). Wage indexation also reduces from 0.75
to 0.02. Insignicance of indexation parameters under AL is conrmed by us. Vilagi
also nds an unambiguous although small in magnitude drops in Calvo parameters in
price- (both M1 -like and M2 -like models) and wage-setting (M2 -like model), which
are conrmed by us only for the M1 model case.
Thus, putting aside results of Milani, one consistent nding of the literature is that
capital adjustment cost parameter falls under AL. Another, more tentative, conclusion
is that adaptive learning estimation leads to habit persistence parameters increase if
under RE it is less than 0.75, but it decreases if already high under RE as in this paper
or Slobodyan and Wouters (2008). It is di¢ cult to establish a common pattern among
the parameters describing nominal rigidities because of di¤erences in this modelling
block and estimated parameters; overall, there seem to be no uniform movement in
nominal rigidities in one or another direction under AL in the papers surveyed, with
Vilagi (2007) being an important exception. Our results partially conrm Vilagi (2007)
but for the fact that indexation parameters are already extremely low in larger models.
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Table 2.2: Model Comparison in Terms of Estimated Parameters
h ' p w p w e  a b g l i g
M1:RE 0.89 0.71 0.97 0.58
AL 0.79 0.61 0.91 0.50 0.101
M2:RE 0.90 0.20 0.05 0.91 0.80 0.86 0.96 0.50 0.92
AL 0.78 0.24 0.04 0.91 0.77 0.75 0.93 0.51 0.97 0.063
M3:RE 0.88 9.44 0.23 0.05 0.91 0.79 0.75 0.21 0.99 0.42 0.93 0.89 0.93
AL 0.73 3.21 0.24 0.04 0.90 0.73 0.58 0.14 0.97 0.34 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.046
In every cell, the top number is the posterior mean of the estimated parameter distri-
bution under RE, and the bottom one is the result of estimation under the baseline
AL specication (only own lag and a constant used to forecast every forward-looking
variable). Only structural rigidity parameters and persistence of exogenous shocks
are presented.
2.4.4 Information Sets
As stated previously, information set which the agents use in forming their expectations
a¤ects the model t to a large degree. To access whether a similar e¤ect is observed with
respect to the estimated parameters, in the Table 2.3 below we present the estimates
for the middle-of-the-road model M2 under adaptive learning for all information sets.
The most striking result is that parameter values are a¤ected to a signicant degree
by the information set. For example, some structural rigidity parameters actually
increase, rather than decrease, under AL estimation when the agents are allowed access
to the MSV solution consistent information set I1. Calvo wages and employment and
price indexation are the lowest in the baseline I3 estimation and the highest in MSV
I1 estimation, with I2 set being right in the middle. With I1, these parameters are
actually higher than under RE. Overall, the REE-consistent set I1 delivers the worst
outcome in terms of mechanicalsources of rigidities, as all parameters either stay the
same as under RE or slightly increase, with l; persistence of the employment shock,
being the only exception.
Another interesting feature to note is that information sets with and without the
constant deliver the most consistent results for the smallest set I3. The only exception
is the estimated gain parameter which is rather high in the baseline estimation with
a constant (0.063) but is much lower without it (0.024). As described in the following
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subsection, high gain implies beliefs that change rather fast in reaction to the data. On
the other hand, all other estimations deliver much lower value of the gain in the region
of 0:02  0:03 (and even 0.007 for MSV solution consistent set I1 with constant). If
the beliefs are close to being unstable at some point during the estimated sample, the
estimation procedure could select a lower gain in which case probability of invoking the
projection facility declines.7 We discuss this issue in more detail in the next subsection
where we describe the beliefs about ination process implied by di¤erent information
sets.
Considering the whole set of estimations for di¤erent information sets, we can say
that in accordance with the model t results, the set of variables that the agents are
assumed to be using for forming expectations inuences the estimation signicantly.
Therefore, any comparison of the results of estimation under adaptive learning across
di¤erent models should take into account the variables used by the agents; in case the
assumed information sets di¤er signicantly, the results could not be compared.
Table 2.3: Information Sets Comparison in Terms of Estimated Parameters
Model M2 h p w p w e a b l g
Rational Expectations 0.90 0.20 0.05 0.91 0.80 0.86 0.96 0.50 0.92
Adaptive Learning, no constant
I3: univariate AR(1) 0.80 0.20 0.05 0.90 0.75 0.74 0.94 0.46 0.95 0.024
I2: endogenous states 0.79 0.41 0.18 0.90 0.82 0.78 0.92 0.50 0.92 0.022
I1: endogenous states and shocks 0.92 0.68 0.08 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.97 0.56 0.51 0.028
Adaptive Learning, with constant
I3: univariate AR(1) 0.78 0.24 0.04 0.91 0.77 0.75 0.93 0.51 0.97 0.063
I2: endogenous states 0.78 0.51 0.14 0.90 0.81 0.79 0.91 0.53 0.92 0.022
I1: endogenous states and shocks 0.88 0.58 0.06 0.90 0.86 0.96 0.96 0.58 0.68 0.007
2.4.5 Initial Beliefs and Sensitivity
As mentioned previously, di¤erent ways of initializing initial beliefs could be considered
as a sensitivity analysis for the AL estimation. Estimation under adaptive learning
7Estimations with frequent projection facilities tend to t the data poorly.
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naturally introduces some free parameters. In W1 way of initializing the learning 
REE-consistent initial beliefs  there is only one extra parameter, the gain. However,
if the estimation depends too sensitively on the initial beliefs, one could criticize AL
estimation with W1 initial beliefs as using in-sample data for the belief optimization.8
If, on the other hand, we could establish that the estimation results remain relatively
stable when initial beliefs are selected from a distribution centered on the W1 beliefs,
we could claim that the estimation is robust to small errors that the agents could make
in forming the beliefs. In the latter case, the estimation results are a function of the
time variability in expectation-forming function and of changes in the transmission
mechanism that are associated with a particular information set, not the initial beliefs
that could be somewhat arbitrary.
To generate W2 initial beliefs, we take the multivariate normal distribution of para-
meters implied by the posterior maximization of a model under adaptive learning with
W1 initial beliefs, and select 1020 draws from this distribution.9 For every parameter
draw, the corresponding REE is then constructed and initial beliefs are derived that
are consistent with the REE in accordance with (14). These initial beliefs are then
xed for the duration of estimation using MCMC. As we argued before, W2 beliefs
allow for some exibility by disentangling the initial beliefsREE (and, thus, transmis-
sion mechanism) and the REE implied by the current parameter draw in the MCMC.
On the other hand, W2 beliefs stay constant during the MCMC, which represents a
constraint on the estimation. In case the estimation results are very sensitive to the
8Several papers using estimation under AL have used optimized initial beliefs, cf. some specica-
tions in Milani (2007) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2005), e¤ectively using the in-sample data
twice. This procedure is hard to justify if one takes the story of agents as econometricians seriously.
On the other hand, REE-consistent W1 initial beliefs in this paper correspond to the agents who
know the probability distribution that would be obtained under particular parameter values and use is
as a starting point, but allow for non-stationarity and/or structural breaks when forming expectations
in real time.
9One could also use the MCMC output directly and randomly select points from there, thus drawing
from true posterior distribution of parameters, not its multivariate normal approximation that could
be signicantly incorrect. Beside simplicity, our procedure has an advantage of allowing to draw from
scaled up or down distribution easily. We had to restrict our distribution to 50% of the approximate
multivariate normal in order to guarantee that most draws for initial beliefs result in a point that
satises inequality restrictions imposed on parameters during the estimation.
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initial beliefs, one would expect either a signicant divergence of estimation results in
terms of the model t or estimated parameters, or at least an increase in condence
intervals of the estimated posterior distribution of parameters. Neither of these e¤ects
is expected when the estimation is insensitive to the initialization.
Another consequence of W2 initial beliefs is as follows. Consider for a moment
posterior probability maximization step under W1 initial beliefs. In the mode, the
REE that is used to construct the initial beliefs (dened by the parameter vector e)
and the REE implied by the model parameter vector  are constrained to be equal,
 = e. Denote posterior mode as 0 = e0. Now, x the initial beliefsparameter vector
at e0 and re-optimize the posterior with respect to . It is clear that at the resulting
posterior mode, 1; we should have a higher value of the posterior, because it is always
possible to set 1 = e0 and get the W1 posterior value.10 Normally, higher posterior is
translated into better marginal data density, and thus we expect that W2 estimation
with the initial beliefsparameter vector e xed at W1 posterior mode value will t
the data better (will have higher marginal data density). If, on the other hand, W2
beliefs parameters e are xed at values that are close to, but not equivalent, to the W1
parameter vector , this partial optimization e¤ect is counterbalanced by the fact
that the initial point in this procedure is likely to have lower posterior that the W1
estimation. If the W2 initial beliefs are close to W1 ones, we would expect the partial
optimizatione¤ect to be stronger, and thus the model t to be improved.
We conduct analysis with W2 beliefs for the baseline information set I3 and all
models. The results across models are qualitatively similar, and thus we concentrate
on reporting middle-of-the-road model M2 estimations only.
Consider rst the model t. Marginal data density for the baseline AL estimation
for M2 equals -129.2 (see Table 2.1). In 17 W2 estimations for the same model with
baseline information set, the marginal data density varies between -129.5 and -127.3,
10This estimation could then be considered as a rst step in the joint optimization of model para-
meters  and belief parameters e, the next step being xing the model paramters at 1 and optimizing
with respect to the belief parameters e to get e1, etc.
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with the mean of -128.0. In other words, the changes are tiny, but on average we
observe a slight improvement, consistent with the partial optimization logic given
above.
Now, let turn attention to the estimated parameters. We select three W2 estima-
tions, those with the highest, the lowest, and the median marginal data density among
the 17 W2 runs that we have conducted. Table 2.4 presents, for the parameters that
reect nominal and real rigidities, the posterior mean and the condence interval for
the selected estimation runs. Clearly, there is little or no di¤erence between the three
estimations. Only for the gain parameter we do observe somewhat larger changes, but
they are well within the estimated HPD intervals. Comparing the parameter estimates
with the corresponding row in the Table 2.3, we see that the parameter estimates under
W2 are extremely to those under W1 but sometimes slightly biased, which is consistent
with the marginal likelihood being higher on average with W2 initial beliefs than W1
beliefs.
A very similar picture can be observed for other models under baseline AL esti-
mation. Thus, we can conclude this part of the sensitivity analysis by stating that
at least for the best information set (only own lag and a constant are used to form
expectations), estimation under adaptive learning with REE-consistent initial beliefs
is extremely robust to small disturbances in the beliefs.
Table 2.4: Sensitivity of Estimated Parameters to Initial Beliefs
Marg.lik h p w p w e a b l g
Lowest 0.79 0.25 0.04 0.91 0.77 0.75 0.93 0.50 0.96 0.058
0.68 0.91 0.14 0.34 0.0 0.09 0.89 0.93 0.72 0.82 0.72 0.78 0.88 0.97 0.39 0.62 0.92 0.99 0.04 0.07
Median 0.79 0.25 0.04 0.91 0.77 0.75 0.93 0.51 0.95 0.066
0.68 0.91 0.15 0.36 0.0 0.09 0.89 0.93 0.71 0.82 0.72 0.78 0.88 0.97 0.36 0.62 0.92 0.99 0.05 0.08
Largest 0.78 0.25 0.04 0.91 0.76 0.75 0.93 0.51 0.95 0.064
0.67 0.90 0.15 0.36 0.0 0.09 0.88 0.93 0.71 0.82 0.72 0.78 0.88 0.98 0.40 0.62 0.93 0.99 0.05 0.08
Model M2 estimated under the baseline AL specication (only own lag and a con-
stant used to forecast every forward-looking variable), W2 beliefs. Only 3 (out of 17)
estimations are presented, with lowest, median, and highest marginal likelihood. In
every cell, the top number is the posterior mean of the estimated parameter distrib-
ution under AL, and the bottom one is the corresponding condence interval. Only
structural rigidity parameters and persistence of exogenous shocks are presented.
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We next turn to another robustness exercise, where initial beliefs are derived from
OLS regression using pre-sample data  W3 beliefs. We use 20 quarters of the data
to form initial beliefs, and estimate the model using the rest of the sample. Again, we
present the results only for the Model M2, baseline information set I3 with a constant.
Given that the estimated sample is now di¤erent, we re-estimate the model using this
shorter sample under W1 beliefs as well.
Regarding the model t, W3 beliefs are doing worse than our baseline adaptive
learning specication: marginal likelihood is just -54.8 vs. -43.2 for W1 beliefs. Both
specications, though, t the data signicantly better than Rational Expectations es-
timation at -96.0. The reason is probably that pre-sample based initial beliefs generate
forecasting functions that are largely inconsistent with the in-sample data. We discuss
the issue in more detail in the following subsection.
Comparison of the estimated parameters shows that estimated parameters di¤er
surprisingly little between the two AL specications: the only parameter that di¤ers
noticeably is price indexation, which increases from 0.25 in the baseline specication to
0.46 under pre-sample beliefs. The gain also di¤ers. As the gain parameter is related
to the speed with which the beliefs are updated, this implies that the biggest di¤erence
between the beliefs could be their volatility and the speed with which expectation
formation function adjusts to the new data. We return to this question again in the
next subsection. Finally, for this shorter sample the di¤erence between estimations
under RE and baseline AL with W1 beliefs is similar to that presented in the Table
2.2.
Table 2.5: Initial Beliefs Comparison in Terms of Estimated Parameters
h p w p w e a b l g
RE 0.87 0.25 0.11 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.934 0.41 0.92
W1 beliefs 0.81 0.25 0.11 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.96 0.47 0.91 0.058
W3 beliefs 0.79 0.46 0.06 0.81 0.72 0.71 0.95 0.45 0.89 0.025
Posterior means of the estimated parameters under RE, AL with REE-consistent
initial beliefs, and AL with pre-sample based beliefs. Baseline AL specication (own
lag and a constant), model M2. Only structural rigidity parameters and persistence
of exogenous shocks are presented.
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2.4.6 Beliefs About Ination and Transmission Mechanism
Adaptive learning could a¤ect model t in several ways. First, time variation of beliefs
allows the model itself to become time varying, cf. (13). This could improve model t
if the process that generates time series of observed variables is itself time-varying. On
the other hand, if the beliefs updating process is too volatile, parameter uncertainty
could lead to deterioration of the t. Another channel through which adaptive learning
operates is through change in the transmission mechanism. Even when the beliefs are
consistent with a REE and are not time varying, if the information set used by the
agents to form expectations di¤ers from the MSV set then the transmission mechanism
di¤ers from that under the Rational Expectations. The fact that information set
a¤ects estimations to a larger degree than initial beliefs (compare the results presented
in Tables 2.1 and 2.3 with those of Tables 2.4-2.5) informs us that the transmission
mechanism e¤ect could be more pronounced than that of time variation.
To illustrate the e¤ect of the transmission mechanism, observe Fig. 2.2 which shows
the coe¢ cients in the agentsforecasting function for ination (also called the Perceived
Law of Motion, or PLM),
t = a+ t 1:
We present values of a and  for W1 and W3 beliefs, I3 information set, model M2,
i.e., the same adaptive learning specications that were described in the Table 2.5.
As beliefs evolve over time, a and  are time varying. One di¤erence between the
initial beliefs is immediate: pre-sample regression based initial beliefs W3 (blue lines)
are much more volatile, despite the fact that estimated gain g for W3 beliefs is much
lower than under W1 beliefs (0.025 vs. 0.058). According to the updating equations
(12), innovations to beliefs are given as gR 1t  Zt 1Tt where t is the forecasting error
at time t. Amount of update is then proportional to the e¤ective gain gR 1t . Under
pre-sample beliefs, e¤ective gain is much larger despite the gain g being lower, which
implies that Rt, the second moments matrix (essentially, variance of ination), is much
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Figure 2.2: PLM beliefs about ination (constant and persistence) under REE-
consistent initial beliefs (W1) and pre-sample based initial beliefs (W3). The agents
perceive the following ination process:
t = a+ t 1:
smaller in the pre-sample than the value implied by the REE with which W1 beliefs
are consistent. Despite the fact that W3 beliefs seem to be more correct(perceived
ination persistence ; blue dotted line, is essentially constant over the estimated time
interval, while a systematic decline is observed for W1 beliefs), their volatility leads to
a signicantly worse model t.
Initial beliefsin the Fig. 2.2 are given as the very rst point of the graph. In the
Rational Expectations Equilibrium implied by the model parameters in W1 estimation,
the agents believe in a very persistent ination. This feature is shared by the modelsM2
andM3 but, signicantly, notM1 (initial ination persistence in modelM1 is closer to
0.5). Notice that if the initial persistence is close to unity, the e¤ective gain parameter
is restricted to low numbers; otherwise, large forecasting errors could result in update
of persistence to values above one, which invokes projection facility. Estimation with
large numbers of projection facilities tend to result in a very bad model t.
Thus, there is a basic tension in initial beliefs that are REE-consistent. The be-
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liefs contain point estimates of the parameters in the forecasting functions ( in Eq.
12), and perceived volatility of variables used to forecast forward-looking variables. If
the perceived volatility is inconsistent with the data-generating process of observed
variables, the estimation procedure whould attempt to adjust the gain parameter to
counteract e¤ect of wrongR0: However, the gain parameter that is too large could
then lead to frequent projection facility hits and very volatile beliefs , with deteri-
orating model t as a consequence. A way of overcoming this problem might be to
introduce two gain parameters, one for updating point forecasting function parameters
 and another for updating the second moments matrix R; or adding a scale parameter
for the matrix R that could be either estimated or calibrated.
To illustrate the e¤ect of the information set used for forecasting on the trans-
mission mechanism, we perform the following. We take a model M2 estimated under
Rational Expectations and x the parameters at their posterior mode values. Then,
taking these parameter values as given, we construct initial beliefs under the infor-
mation sets I1, I2, and I3 that are compatible with this REE.11 Finally, using thus
derived transmission mechanism (matrices T and R in Eq. 10), we calculate impulse
response function of ination, interest rate, and output to productivity, price mark-up,
consumption preference, and monetary policy shocks. The results are presented in
Fig. 2.3. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to impulse responses under
I1, I2, and I3 information set, respectively. As we see from the gure, even in cases
when the impact e¤ect of a particular shock on a variable is similar under the three
information sets, the impulse responses show very disparate transitions towards the
long-run steady state (i.e., the response of nominal interest rate to consumption pref-
erence shock). On another hand, there are impulse responses that diverge already on
impact. Some of them also evolve in di¤erent directions during the adjustment (for
example, the response of output to price mark-up shock). Therefore, even for the same
model parameters, the three alternative information sets used by learning agents for
11At the REE, the constants in forecasting functions must equal zero, therefore, information sets
with and without the constant generate equivalent initial beliefs.
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forecasting imply di¤erent transmission mechanisms. Our results also indicate that
there is a tendency for impulse responses with I3 information set to be more persistent
but less pronounced in magnitude, at least at the REE consistent initial beliefs.
Another exercise useful for studying the properties of the transmission mechanism
under alternative learning schemes is the analysis of ination persistence implied by
di¤erent information sets. In order to perform this task, we take estimation results
under learning for the model M2 with three information sets. In every case, we x the
parameters at the corresponding posterior mode values and compute ination persis-
tence implied by the Actual Law of Motion, given by (13).12 The results are presented
in Fig.2.4. In accordance with the previous analysis of Impulse Responses, we see that
initial I3 REE-consistent beliefs imply very persistent ination. Another important
observation is that implied ination persistence under I1 and I2 information sets is
rather stable over time, whereas it exhibits dramatic changes under I3. This means
that if trueination persistence based on real data was changing fast, the I3 learning
model would be better positioned to capture this data generating process. Given that
I3 learning rule outperforms I2 and I1 in terms of the model t (see Table 2.1), we
suggest that the data generating process was indeed changing with the time, and I3
model was successful in capturing such a dynamic adjustment. We believe that our
results are in line with some of the previous studies on ination persistence (especially
those that estimated the persistence with time-variation in the mean of ination or
over short time sample), which suggest that ination in the euro area might have been
only moderately persistent in 1995-2002. For a detailed survey of such results see Table
3.1 in Altissimo et al (2006).
To provide somewhat more intuition about the dynamics of implied ination per-
sistence, we consider the components that contribute to the update of the beliefs coef-
cients. Equation (12a) illustrates that, given the same forecasting error, the update
12Note that we cannot compare the beliefs about ination directly as in the Fig. 2, because the
forecasting equations are di¤erent under the information sets I1-I3. In terms of the adaptive learning
literature, Fig. 4 presents the Actual Law of Motion, or ALM, for ination.
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of belief coe¢ cients  will depend on the value of the e¤ectivegain gR 1, where R 1
is inverse of the matrix of the second moments. Figure 2.5 shows one of the terms of
the second moments matrix corresponding to expected squared ination for 3 models
I1, I2, and I3. The graph indicates that squared ination is expected to be very high
under I1 information set, thus making the e¤ective gain very small and resulting in
relatively minor updates to the belief coe¢ cients in response to the forecasting errors.
This, in turn, leads to very smooth time series for implied ination persistence. In a
model with I2 information set, agents believe that the second moment of ination is
much smaller and rather stable, which implies that beliefs are updated stronger than in
I1 case, but the implied ination persistence still does not vary much. Finally, agents
using I3 information set believe that, initially, expected squared ination is rather high
but drops fast, which is consistent with a noticeable fall in implied ination persis-
tence. This downward adjustment of perceived second moment of ination combined
with high estimated gain coe¢ cient (about 2 times higher than for I2 or I1) result in a
high value of e¤ectivegain. High gain means signicant updates of belief coe¢ cients
which is reected in a signicant fall of implied ination persistence under I3 beliefs
before 2000.13
2.5 Conclusions
As far as the sensitivity of the estimation results to the chosen learning rule is con-
cerned, we nd that the more restrictive information set available to the agents is,
the better is the model t. In particular, the greatest improvement in marginal data
density and the most signicant change in the estimated parameters relative to the RE
estimation are observed when the forecasts are made using univariate AR(1) processes.
In general, the estimated parameters associated with di¤erent information sets used in
forecasting rules vary signicantly. We demonstrate that for the full information set
13Subsequent increase in implied persistence is explained by the fact that during this period the
simple AR1 forecasting model was mostly underpredicting ination, which led the agents to update
perceived persistence of ination upwards.
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consisting of all endogenous states and shocks  the same set of variables as under
rational expectations, the estimated structural rigidity parameters as well as model
marginal data density are closest to those obtained under RE. This conclusion is in
line with some of the earlier research which documented little di¤erence between the
estimation results under RE and adaptive learning. Very importantly, we have estab-
lished that this conclusion holds independently of the model complexity: In all three
models considered here, ranging from a three equation New Keynesian model to a
Smets and Wouters type model, forecasting forward-looking variables using univariate
AR(1) processes brings the best results.
We believe that the reason for signicant di¤erences among the estimation results
with alternative information sets is the e¤ect of the set on transmission mechanism
of the model: even for identical parameter values, the impulse responses implied by
the REE-consistent initial beliefs (i.e., before any belief updating has taken place)
show very disparate dynamic behavior of macroeconomic variables. Magnitude and
persistence of the responses depend on the assumed information set to a signicant
degree, leading to divergence in the overall model t and estimated parameters.
We also nd that di¤erent ways of forming the initial beliefs inuence the dynamics
of the model under learning. REE-consistent initial beliefs produce more persistent
and less volatile evolution of ination expectations than pre-sample regression based
initial beliefs. High volatility of pre-sample beliefs is a probable reason for the fact
that they generally lead to a worse model t than REE-consistent initial beliefs in our
estimation. On the other hand, pre-sample beliefs could be very sensitive to short-term
but pronounced developments in the data, which might lead to the agentsforecasting
functions changing dramatically over the in-sample. This sensitivity is likely to lead to
a large variability of estimated results, making them less credible.
On the contrary, the REE-consistent initial beliefs are found to be very robust
in adaptive learning estimations, in the sense that moderate deviations in the REE
employed to construct such initial beliefs lead to essentially identical marginal data
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density and estimated parameters. The fact that REE-consistent initial beliefs produce
rather robust outcomes means that the estimation results are mainly driven by the time-
varying transmission mechanism introduced by adaptive learning rather than by the
specic initial conditions. The robustness of the REE-consistent initial beliefs can also
motivate the preference for such model-drivenapproach to form the initial conditions
when estimating the DSGE models for policy analysis and forecasting.
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Appendix. Tables and Figures
Table of priors
Parameter description Prior distribution, M1 Prior distribution, M2 Prior distribution, M3
Notation Type Mean St.err Type Mean St.err Type Mean St.err
Stand. errors of shocks:
preference cons. ab I.Gam. 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.2 2 I.Gam 0.2 2
policy rule ar I.Gam. 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.1 2
price markup ap I.Gam. 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.15 2 I.Gam 0.15 2
wage markup aw I.Gam 0.25 2 I.Gam 0.25 2
productivity aa I.Gam 0.4 2 I.Gam 0.4 2
labor supply a l I.Gam 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.1 2
employment am I.Gam 0.1 2 I.Gam 0.1 2
investment a inv I.Gam 0.1 2
price of capital aq I.Gam 0.4 2
governm.spend. ag I.Gam 0.3 2
Autoreg. coefficient:
preference consump. _b UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 Beta 0.85 0.1 Beta 0.85 0.1
productivity _a Beta 0.85 0.1 Beta 0.85 0.1
labor supply _ l Beta 0.85 0.1 Beta 0.85 0.1
investment _ inv Beta 0.85 0.1
govern. spending _g Beta 0.85 0.1
Structural parameters:
Utility function consumption a Norm. 1 0.375 Norm. 1 0.375 Norm. 1 0.375
Utility function labor R Norm. 2.5 0.25 Norm. 2 0.5
Habit h Beta 0.7 0.1 Beta 0.7 0.1 Beta 0.7 0.1
Indexation prices Tp UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29
Indexation wages Tw UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29
Calo prices Yp Beta 0.75 0.1 Beta 0.75 0.05 Beta 0.75 0.05
Calvo wages Yw Beta 0.75 0.05 Beta 0.75 0.05
Calvo employment Ym Beta 0.75 0.15 Beta 0.5 0.15
Inter.rate smoothing w UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 UÝ0,1Þ 0.5 0.29 Beta 0.8 0.1
policy rule, inflation Q^ Norm. 1.5 0.1 Norm. 1.5 0.1 Norm. 1.7 0.1
policy rule, output term Qy Norm. 0.5 0.1 Norm. 0.5 0.1 Norm. 0.125 0.05
Investment ajustment cost j UÝ1,11Þ 6 2.5
Var. capital utilization f Norm. 0.2 0.075
Gain (learning param.) g Gam. 0.035 0.03 Gam. 0.035 0.03 Gam. 0.035 0.03
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response functions under di¤erent information sets
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Figure 2.4: Implied ination persistence under di¤erent information sets
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Figure 2.5: Implied second moments of ination under di¤erent information sets
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